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International School Director Turnover as Influenced by 
School Board/Director Relationship 
By Zakariya S. Palsha 
Chairperson of the Dissertation Committee:    Dr. Thomas Alsbury 
         School of Education 
In recent years, public school superintendents have faced increased demands from 
rigorous federal and state accountability standards. Yet, researchers have reported that 
academic improvement does not happen by chance but rather through effective leaders 
with ample time to implement broad, sustainable reform. The purpose of this study was to 
examine the self-reported causes of turnover of international school directors, 
specifically, whether the relationship between the school board and the international 
school director is linked to length of tenure of the international director. The theoretical 
framework that addresses superintendent turnover as influenced by internal board 
dynamics, including school board/superintendent relationship, is the Decision Output 
Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005). Descriptive data seem to indicate the quality of relationship 
between the international school director and the school board as a possible factor for 
international school directors to leave their previous position. There was a correlation 
between "quality of relationship" and "length of tenure," rs (120) = -.419, p < .001. There 
seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire organizational 
structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting. It seems evident that the 
understanding of building a positive relationship between the international school director 
 
and school board, founded on trust and respect, is one that has a far-reaching impact on 
the length of tenure. 
 
KEYWORDS: Wirt and Kirst, Decision Output Theory; superintendent turnover, length of 
tenure; leadership turnover, length of tenure; international school director turnover, 





Turnover of the top administrator in an organization is equivalent to a newly 
elected president. Change is often the order of the day, even if the new president is from 
the same political party. The new leader usually possesses and enacts certain 
individualities, ethos, goals, and even foibles; different from the former president.  
Unlike a new president, the causes of turnover and the reasons for tenure of the 
top administrators of school districts (Cooper, Fusarelli, & Carella, 2000; Kowalski, 
1999) can be even more difficult to identify because the incumbent may be removed by a 
simple majority vote of the respective board of directors. Contrastingly, the causes for the 
removal of the president are limited by a Constitution. A Constitution often provides for 
both stability and change. It is known that the president may be removed by the will of 
the electorate. However, once elected, it is extremely difficult to remove a president. 
In a case where a president resigns, dies, or is unable to carry out their duties, a 
Constitution provides a stable method for the transfer of power. Conversely, this type of 
systematic stability does not exist in school systems. Further, international school 
environments in particular, fail to provide even basic due process elements with regards 
to director turnover.  
Turnover is a reality among both superintendents and international school 
directors. Although each position is quite unique in terms of degrees, certification, and 
management styles, each is also very much related. Some skills and duties germane to 
both positions are long-range planning, human resource management, fiduciary decision-
making, and public relations, to name a few. The differences lie more in the environment 
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in which they operate and the purpose or the motivation of their positions. School 
districts in the United States that prepare the young to enter the workforce or to go on to 
higher education are vastly different from non-profit schools that typically exist to meet a 
human service need or to accomplish an altruistic mission. Both contrast greatly from for-
profit international schools motivated to make money and increase their market share of 
the service they provide. 
Turnover and the tenure in their previous position of top school administrators can 
be volatile (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Whitaker, 2015; Chingos, 
Whitehurst, & Lindquist, 2014). Opinion polls, political pundits, and the success or 
failure of foreign and domestic policies and decisions seem to influence the voting public 
and affect a president’s length of stay in office. While a school director’s tenure may be 
influenced by the opinions of staff members, parents, community public relations, and 
selective outcome measures, like test scores; a director’s dismissal or pressured 
resignation may depend more upon the director’s relationship with members of their 
school board (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Gore, 2015; Mountford, 
2008). 
Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 
2005), this study explored possible reasons for international school director tenure in 
previous positions. To date, only two studies have measured explicitly the reasons for the 
turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; Moos & Paulsen, 
2014). This study narrowed the focus on the relationship between school boards and 
international school directors through use of a questionnaire of international school 
directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia.  
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Historical Context 
The superintendency is an occupation with very little security (Fusarelli, Cooper, 
& Carella, 2003; Kowalski, McCord, Petersen, Young, & Ellerson, 2010), fewer benefits 
than similar jobs in the private sector, and one that faces increased public criticism and 
scrutiny, and increasing complexity (Goodman & Zimmerman, 2000; Hoyle, Bjork, 
Collier, & Glass, 2005; Kowalski et al., 2010). Indeed, the role of the school 
superintendent could be characterized as daunting and challenging. Due to the increasing 
challenges of the job, concerns about the availability of quality candidates to fill 
superintendent vacancies have persisted (Cooper et al., 2000; Hoyle et al., 2005; Kowalski 
et al., 2010; Waters & Marzano, 2007). In recent years, public school superintendents 
have faced increased demands from federal accountability mandates (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2002, 2009) and rigorous state accountability standards.  
Some believe the complexity of the superintendent position and the declining 
number of qualified candidates for the position may present a problem for districts 
striving to improve student performance, especially among underrepresented populations. 
This concern emanates from the presumption that not only the quality of superintendent 
leadership (Waters & Marzano, 2007), but that stable tenure of a superintendent 
(Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Alsbury & Whitaker, 2015) influences student 
achievement. Fullan (2002) suggested that academic improvement does not happen by 
chance but rather through effective school and district leaders with ample time to 
implement broad, sustainable reform. 
However, the link between superintendent leadership and student performance is 
questioned. Some have argued that by supporting building-level leadership (principals), 
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the superintendent is ultimately accountable for the success or failure of student 
achievement—which in today’s world is measured through state standardized 
assessments such as the SBA (Smarter Balanced Assessment), HSPE (High School 
Proficiency Exam) and EOC (End of Course) assessments in Washington State. 
Unfortunately, Hoyle and colleagues (2005) expressed that the success or failure of 
various superintendents (as indicated by tenure) is an ambiguous and not thoroughly 
researched subject.  
There seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire 
organizational structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting (Alsbury, 
2008a, 2015; Alsbury &Whitaker, 2015; Waters & Marzano, 2007). While existing 
studies have concluded that turnover of the top administrator often revolves around poor 
board/executive relations, regardless of the reason for turnover, this phenomenon may 
cause difficulties in recruiting and securing the next top management position. Although 
a school organization is in crisis, it may present a lucrative, yet arduous opportunity for 
the successor who is hired to solve these acute problems.  
Theoretical Constructs 
As noted above, several theories are proposed to help explain the political 
environment within schools and their communities. Theories include the Dissatisfaction 
Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970), the Continuous Participation Theory 
(Zeigler & Jennings, 1974), and the Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005). Each 
of these theories contrasts in their foundation as to whether the governance of education 
is truly democratic and responsive to, or influenced by, the community. As it pertains to 
the focus of this study, these theories also provide support for the variables that most 
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likely influence superintendent and school director turnover. These theories are based 
upon and describe the political reality for school boards in the U.S. and cannot be directly 
applied to the study of international directors. However, the Decision Output Theory 
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005), provides a framework that can be used to define the effect of school 
board/director relationship and director tenure in this study.  
Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy. In 1962, Lutz conducted a case study 
utilizing 25 years of historical data, an 18-month participant observer experience, and a 
three-year follow-up observation. The Lutz dissertation was conducted at Washington 
University in St. Louis, Missouri. Two years later, the research continued at the 
Claremont Graduate School, where Iannaccone and Lutz (1994) made the theoretical 
argument they later named the Dissatisfaction Theory. Using the theoretical basis 
described in the writings of Mosca (1939) and Key (1955), they focused on a key 
component that became the Turning Point Election Period (TPEP). Iannaccone and Lutz 
described a TPEP as a multi-step process they tested and validated. Afterwards, many 
other studies validated and further developed the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & 
Lutz, 1970). 
The Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970) suggests 
that local school board governance is a cyclic democratic process. In a public school 
district, local community politics directly affect school board members and 
superintendents. Public dissatisfaction can result in school board member defeat at the 
polls or school board members being forced into early resignation or retirement. In the 
absence of tenure laws for administrators in many states, superintendents lack protections 
and are vulnerable to replacement. Frequent superintendent turnover causes discontinuity 
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in organizational goals, policy, and procedures, that can negatively affect the entire 
organization (Glass & Franceschini, 2007; Grady and Bryant, 1989). In addition, rapid 
turnover of top school officials can impede the achievement of positive school reform 
(Glass & Franceschini, 2007).  
As it pertains to the topic of focus in this study, Dissatisfaction Theory 
(Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970) does not speak directly to the relationship between the board 
and superintendent as a cause of superintendent turnover. Instead, Dissatisfaction Theory 
indicates that the causes for superintendent turnover would be the result of an event of 
politically motivated school board turnover. Thus, superintendent turnover is not 
specifically due to a souring relationship between the superintendent and the existing 
school board, but rather an effect caused by decline in community satisfaction and the 
subsequent defeat and pressured resignation of the school board.  
Continuous Participation Theory of Democracy. The Continuous Participation 
Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974) rejects the premise of the Dissatisfaction Theory that 
school boards operate in a democratic fashion. The theory suggests that low voter turnout 
and a lack of genuine competitors for school board seats is typical in local school board 
elections. This theory suggests that the lack of participation by the community prevents 
the local school board from being truly representative of their constituency; therefore, it 
is undemocratic in its composition and function. 
Jennings and Ziegler’s (1968) study consisted of 581 board members and 94 
superintendents in 96 school districts across the United States. They looked at the degree 
school boards were responsive to the public and the extent to which boards act on the 
basis of public needs. The researchers relied upon a definition of democracy based upon 
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continuous participation (with competition during elections) in the political area. In other 
words, the theory focuses primarily on the turnout rate of voters to school board elections 
who use their electoral authority to elect a school board that represents them as 
constituents. The degree to which school boards exemplify democratic principles was 
dependent upon the degree to which school boards were responsive to the preferences of 
their local community to determine: the representative nature of the school board team; 
recruitment and selection process of school board members; relationship between the 
board members and the public; and the relationship between the board members and the 
superintendent. Basically, in the ideal democratic scenario, voters select the school board 
in accordance with constituency preferences, the board formulates policies in response to 
the community, and the superintendent implements said policies. Ziegler and Jennings 
concluded that evidence suggested this idea is not fully recognized in school districts. 
The Continuous Participation Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974) concludes that 
school boards do not necessarily represent their constituents. Regarding this study, the 
Continuous Participation Theory provides no direct evidence regarding the relationship 
between the board and the superintendent or the reason for the turnover of a 
superintendent. However, because it contends that the board maintains a status quo and 
does not represent its community, the likelihood of a souring relationship between the 
superintendent and the board is diminished. Indeed, a stable board would be much easier 
for a superintendent to get to know and to maintain a positive relationship with. In this 
theory, the primary reasons for superintendent turnover would be apolitical turnover 
predicated upon moves to larger districts with more pay or due to community changes 
leading to school board turnover.  
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Decision Output Theory. The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) 
suggests the governance of local school boards is affected by the limitations of economic 
and personnel resources in local school districts. Another significant notion is the low 
number of citizens who actually provide input to school boards. School boards decide 
which actions to take from few options, and with limited resources, causing subjectivity 
and inconsistency in their decisions. Wirt and Kirst’s (2005) model assumes educational 
policy-making is innately a political process that allocates value preferences thorough 
material (i.e., curriculum). The democratic nature of this process is determined by the 
interrelationships between the political system and other subsystems of the social 
environment. Wirt and Kirst illustrated these links by describing how subsystems 
generate inputs of demands on and supports of the political [school] system. They 
suggested the school system converts these inputs or demands into public decisions or 
outputs, which in turn feed allocated values back into the social environment. Since 
school districts lack sufficient resources to meet each demand placed upon them by the 
community, they must choose which group’s demands to act upon and which to dismiss. 
As a result, the school board may or may not meet the needs of many of its constituency. 
Their choice of which concern to address is generally dependent on whether or not the 
school board has a clear understanding of the major issues in their respective 
communities. 
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is the theory most likely to 
predict that superintendent turnover may be caused by the relationship between the board 
and superintendent. This theory deals with the internal interactions within the school 
board as they debate the management of limited resources. This theory suggests that 
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perhaps a superintendent and school board relationship could sour due to a disagreement 
over policy decisions and allocation of resources. The possibility of superintendent 
turnover caused by relationship issues (and not only board turnover) is supported more by 
the Decision Output theory than by either the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz, 
1970) or the Continuous Participation Theory. 
Figure 1 depicts the various theories associated with superintendent turnover and 
their underlying differences, yet all leading to a very similar outcome of turnover by the 
superintendent or the school board (as it states in the Dissatisfaction Theory). As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the Decision Output Theory is the theory that can best predict the 
relationship between the school board and the superintendent as a possible cause of 
turnover. 
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Reischauer’s (1973) assertion, “we need a profound reshaping of education if 
mankind is to survive in the sort of world that is fast evolving” (p. 3) still holds true 
today. Arguably, continuity in the superintendent position may contribute to the 
“profound reshaping of education” that Reischauer predicted. Unfortunately, according to 
Kowalski et al. (2010), the superintendency has become a job so daunting that 
superintendent tenure is on the decline. Because superintendent turnover is thought to 
negatively influence school performance (Alsbury, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2015; Chingos et 
al., 2014), one pressing question is what are the factors that lead to superintendent 
turnover? There has been much speculation about superintendent tenure and turnover; 
however, very little current quantitative research exists detailing the characteristics of 
superintendent tenure (Alsbury, 2003, 2008b; Chingos et al., 2014).  
Turnover in the top administrative position in any organizational structure is a 
phenomenon that can be disruptive, whether it is planned, self-imposed, or imposed on 
the incumbent (Alsbury, 2003, 2008b). Few studies indicate the reasons for 
superintendent turnover but include obtaining a more lucrative or desirable position, poor 
board relations, and faulty management decisions as reported reasons (Alsbury, 2003, 
2008b). The problem is that studies on the effects of turnover in the top administrative 
positions within school districts in international schools focused on the reasons for 
superintendent turnover are limited (Moos & Paulsen, 2014) and none explicitly measure 
the influence of board/director relationship on tenure.  
This study focused on the presence of a significant relationship between the 
relationship of the school board and director on director tenure. In addition, age, gender, 
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race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position were analyzed for a 
significant relationship to director tenure.  
Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of 
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationships 
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the 
international director in their previous position.  
Data was gathered through a questionnaire including director gender, race, age, 
highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position of international school 
directors. Each respondent who completed the questionnaire was asked to write 
explaining why they left their last position. The data were analyzed to determine whether 
the relationship between the school board and the international school director is linked 
to the tenure in their previous position – moreover, whether other factors including age, 
gender race, highest degree achieved, are also linked to tenure in their previous position. 
Research questions. Specifically, this study investigated the following questions: 
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors? 
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school 
directors correlate to length of tenure? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree 
achieved, and tenure in their previous position?  
Methods and analysis. A questionnaire (see Appendix A) was sent to 300 
international school directors. The data collected included: age, gender, race, highest 
degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position, along with open ended questions, 
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and a question that asked specifically about the school board and superintendent 
relationship in the previous position.  
This study collected self-reported perceived factors influencing the turnover of 
international school directors. The study examined whether school director/school board 
relationship influences director tenure in the previous position. The questionnaire 
(Appendix A) has demographic information as well as short answer responses that 
determine if relationship is a factor in director turnover. The follow-up question to the 
open-ended question (question 14) in the questionnaire provided information regarding 
the director and school board relationship.  
Spearman’s rank-order correlation was run as a method of analysis. The third 
research question was analyzed and assessed using Spearman’s rho, a point-biserial 
correlation and a one-way ANOVA. 
Glossary of terms. 
Superintendent of Schools: the chief school officer of a school organization. 
School Director: synonymous to superintendent of schools in the international 
school community. 
School Board: an elected council that helps determine educational policy in a 
small, city- or county-sized region (example: Seattle School Board oversees educational 
policy for the Seattle School District). 
School Board Turnover: the number of times a school board member is replaced 
during a period of time (i.e., could be through elections and voter dissatisfaction; election 
to higher office or relocation of the elected official; or in some cases forced to resign 
from office). 
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Superintendent Turnover: the number of times a superintendent is replaced during 
a period of time. 
Superintendent/School Board Relationship: the school board is the 
superintendent’s statutory employer and supervisor, and the two parties work together to 
co-create policy for the school district. 
Significance of Study 
The practical significance of the study is two-fold. First, the study attempted to 
raise awareness about the consequences of turnover to school districts so that proper 
planning for a successor may begin. Second, it attempted to determine what leads to the 
turnover of international school directors and if relationship to the school board is a 
contributing factor. The school board should be aware that a change in the top 
administrator, either voluntary or demanded by the board, may have consequences on the 
organization. The school board must consider the effects of director turnover on 
employee morale, negative public relations, and even the potential divisive infighting 
between upper administrators, as well as the occurrence of politics and strained relations 
among board members. All of these may have a lasting effect on the immediate and long-
term future of the school district. A practical outcome of this study may contribute to 
improved administrative and institutional practices so as to prevent, to the extent 
possible, predictable and unnecessary turnover, and assist with the very practical 
management mechanism of a succession plan. 
This particular study will not likely provide findings leading to theoretical 
significance regarding superintendent turnover theory. In regards to a substantive 
significance, only one other international school director turnover study exists, (Moos & 
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Paulsen, 2014) which covered the Nordic region of Europe; therefore, this particular 
study would add to the research of international school director turnover. Furthermore, a 
key variable of elected versus appointed boards will be asked in the questionnaire and 
this could support the relevancy of the Dissatisfaction Theory beyond the U.S., for 
elected boards, based on the findings. 
Summary 
This study is organized into five chapters along with cited references, the blank 
questionnaire and relevant appendices. The first chapter is the overview of the research 
project. It includes an introduction, problem statement, purpose, significance, glossary of 
terms and a summary. The second chapter is a current review of the literature regarding 
superintendent turnover and the causes for such turnover. The third chapter explains the 
research methodology, research questions, procedures, the null hypotheses, and the 
analysis methods. The third chapter also describes the scope and limitations of the study, 
population and sample, survey instrument and the data collection procedures and a 
summary. The fourth chapter presents the findings along with the analysis of the data and 
its interpretation, based upon quantitative testing and qualitative inquiry. Furthermore, it 
reports the analysis using Spearman’s rho, point-biserial correlation, and a one-way 
ANOVA. The fifth and last chapter provides summaries, implications (both practical and 




Causes of Superintendent Turnover: An Examination of the Research 
This issue of superintendent turnover is not limited to one section of the country 
(Cooper et al., 2000; Grady & Bryant, 1991; Hosman, 1990; Metzger, 1997) or to rural 
school districts (Eaton & Sharp, 1996; Grady & Bryant, 1991) or to urban school districts 
(Cooper et al., 2000; Kowalski, 1999; Yee & Cuban, 1996).  
The position of school superintendent is one of the more difficult, complicated 
jobs in the educational profession (Chingos et al., 2014; Kowalski, 1999; Metzger, 1997; 
Waters & Marzano, 2007), because most, if not all, decisions and meetings are open to 
the community which subject the superintendent to public scrutiny and ridicule, 
especially during times of taxpayer revolt. Citizens with political aspirations, declared 
change agents, and sometimes disgruntled voters and taxpayers who often run for board 
of education seats (Alsbury, 2003; Natkin et al., 2002), could put the superintendent at 
odds with newly-elected board members (Alsbury, 2003). The superintendent of schools 
must publicly juggle a number of conflicting variables that sometimes lead to disputes 
with incumbent school board members (Carter & Cunningham, 1997; Cuban, 1998; 
Iannaccone & Lutz, 1994). Some of these disputes have been traced back to a series of 
school reforms, generally started after the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education’s report (Gardner et al., 1983) A Nation at Risk warned that the United States’ 
educational system was inadequate, while not appropriately teaching the nation’s youth. 
Farrar (1990) argued that these reforms came in three waves: the first, focused on 
improving student performance; the second, focused on upgrading teacher certification, 
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pay and working conditions; the third, focused on the preparation of school 
administrators. It is this third school reform effort that has become most contentious for 
the school superintendent.  
Due to deteriorating resources and an increased demand for more and better 
educational outcomes, the tension between the school board and the superintendent has 
become more volatile (Kowalski, 1999). Giles and Giles (1990) found that over a six-
year period in California, a staggering 75% of superintendent turnover was attributable to 
disharmonious board relations.  
Danzberger and Usdan (1994) argued that the present system of a school board 
carrying out local educational practices through delegated state authority has changed 
very little since the early 20th century. Educational reformers have agreed that meaningful 
educational change is more likely to be successful when pursued at the local school board 
level, which is generally supported by the community and the professional educators, 
including the superintendents (Kowalski, 1999). Seemingly, however, these good 
educational policies and reforms are at the success or failure of the relationship held 
between the board of education and the superintendent. Blumberg (1985) noted that:  
It is not surprising that superintendents have tended to think of the school board in 
terms of individual members rather than as a group. Both the superintendent’s 
professional reputation and his personal welfare depend greatly on his ability to 
influence its decisions. Further, it is primarily through the one-on-one linkage 
between superintendent and school board member that attempts to influence take 
place. There is nothing underhanded about this. It is an accepted and legitimate 
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part of the workings of our political institutions--and lest there by any 
misunderstandings, school boards definitely are political institutions. (pp. 76-77)  
Therefore, the superintendent’s relationship with the board is critical, not just for 
educating the district’s students, but also for job security of the superintendent (Sharp, 
1994). Cuban (1988) stated that “…the central image [of a superintendent] is negotiator-
statesman which is one of politics” (p. 116). Since superintendents must attempt to 
establish positive relationships with all board members, Kowalski (1999) warned that 
even positive relations cultivated over several years may be ruined by “a misconstrued 
comment, the failure to accommodate the request for a favor, or the unwillingness to 
support a particular position on a controversial policy matter” (p. 45). Inevitably, the 
superintendent and the school board are always in an uneasy conflict with one another 
(Blumberg, 1985; Carter & Cunningham, 1997; Chance & Capps, 1990, 1992; Kowalski, 
1999; Sharp & Walter, 2003). 
Since this relationship is political, the superintendent’s trustfulness and honesty 
come into play (Achilles, 1997; Blumberg, 1985; Dlugosh, 1997; Fullan, 2002; Hoyle et 
al., 2005). Bennis (1989) suggested successful leaders, regardless of what profession or 
where they are in an organizational hierarchy, need to have the competency he calls 
“management of trust.” This ability grows from the leader’s capacity to be reliable and 
constant, which builds a record of support of issues when there are competing factions 
and pressures upon the leader. In other words, the person making the decision has the 
confidence and the support of the people for whom he or she is making the decision 
(Dlugosh, 1997). Even if a number of people publicly disagree with the superintendent of 
schools over some emotional problem, such as the promotion of a bond issue or an 
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increase in school taxes, there is a tendency to respect the honesty of the superintendent. 
When a superintendent is honest, forthright, and assertive, the board of education tends to 
inspire trust with the superintendent and helps to build his or her credibility. Blumberg 
(1985) stated that “the lack of those two ingredients to the relationship--trust and 
credibility--makes for an untenable situation” (p. 81). Eventually this type of 
circumstance will lead to the superintendent being replaced (Lutz & Iannaccone, 1986).  
However, there are a number of other reasons why superintendents leave their 
positions than just board/superintendent relations. Dlugosh (1994), in a study of 
contributing factors of turnover of school administrators in Nebraska, found that 
administrators wanted to acquire “better” positions (with usually greater financial reward 
or higher status in the profession, such as movement to a larger district), or they wanted 
to move to a larger community. A few superintendents left because of family pressures, 
stress, working conditions and school board relations.  
Major Studies Supporting the Study 
For at least five decades, researchers have been interested in the question of why 
superintendents leave their school districts (see Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970). Though the 
question has been recurrent in the literature over this time period, most data used to 
address it have come from case studies, interviews, and small-scale surveys which may 
not be representative of the nation as a whole. However, a few national studies have used 
quantitative methods measuring superintendent turnover. These include the Natkin et al. 
study (2002); the American Association of School Superintendents surveys (Glass, Bjork, 
& Brunner, 2000; Kowalski et al., 2010); and the Alsbury studies (2003; 2008b). 
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Natkin, Cooper, Alborano, Padilla and Ghosh Study. Natkin et al. (2002) 
provided a quantitative study on survival of the superintendency. The study included two 
distinct sets of public school districts: (a) all those in North Carolina (n = 117), and (b) a 
national random sample of school districts provided by the American Association of 
School Administrators (n = 462). These were used to check for validity; then merged into 
one larger dataset for analysis. 
These researchers found that superintendent tenure averaged six to seven years, 
regardless of the district’s size or location. Factors significantly related to 
superintendents’ longevity in office were the extent of school board involvement in 
management, support for needed construction, and consolidation of school systems, 
district poverty level, and superintendent’s post-graduate education. The research 
indicated that superintendent tenure had not markedly increased since 1975, and that 
superintendent turnover was not as serious an issue as sometimes portrayed by news 
media. Despite this result, Natkin et al. revealed that, when combined, the factors of high 
poverty of students enrolled in the district, minimal support for construction of new 
facilities, and micromanagement by school governance, lead to shorter tenure.  
In their study, Natkin et al. (2002) sought to determine median superintendent 
tenure, the relationship between tenure and district demographics, activities of the school 
board and their effect on superintendent tenure, and the effect of the superintendent’s 
level of education on his/her tenure. An instrument entitled Superintendent Longevity and 
Time Study (SLATS) was developed for the study. The researchers had a return rate of 
81% (95 out of 117) from North Carolina districts and 42.6% (197 out of 462) from the 
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national sample. Each school district provided feedback on one or more superintendents, 
all of which was factored into the study’s 892 cases. 
While this study did not specifically ask about the relationship between the school 
board and the superintendent when researching on superintendent turnover, the study 
found high levels of poverty, minimal support in regards to new facilities, and micro-
management to be reasons for shorter tenure. This supports the Decision Output Theory 
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005) with regards to the statement: “governance of local school boards is 
affected by the limitations of economic and personnel resources in local school districts.” 
These factors all describe what one can infer to be a relationship strained because the 
demands placed on the superintendent were not met, which therefore caused friction in 
the relationship between the school board and the superintendent. 
American Association of School Superintendents Surveys. Since 1923, the 
American Association of School Administrators (AASA) has conducted nationwide 
surveys of district superintendents. Every 10 years, thousands of superintendents are 
surveyed in an effort to provide a national perspective on the roles and responsibilities 
associated with the district superintendency. The two most recent surveys have shown 
that demographics such as race, age, and gender for the position of superintendent have 
not experienced much change over the last decade (Glass et al., 2000; Kowalski et al., 
2010). One of the most comprehensive studies about superintendent characteristics is the 
Glass et al. study of the American school superintendent. In this 2000 study, Glass and 
his colleagues examined and analyzed superintendent demographics such as age, gender, 
and ethnicity from a historical perspective. The researchers determined that there were 
12,604 “regular public school districts” (Glass et al., 2000, p. 10), and of that population 
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a random sample of 5,336 superintendents were chosen to participate in the study. The 
survey instrument for the 2000 study was developed by AASA staff and the researchers. 
Items from the 1992 study were largely reused for the 2000 study, and items from the 
1982 study were used to develop the 1992 survey instrument. The use of previous 10-
year study survey items were incorporated to provide comparative data.  
The survey was mailed to the participants with a 42.4% (2,262) rate of return. 
Data from the returned surveys was analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) software and was disaggregated by total response group, enrollment 
strata, gender, and minority categories. Both simple percentage and cross-tabulation were 
used to present the findings. These are the only two methods of data analysis mentioned.  
Researchers surveyed 2,262 superintendents and reported findings that did not 
differ dramatically from previous decennial studies. The average age for superintendents 
was reported to have been 52 and the vast majority of superintendents continued to be 
Caucasian males. It was noted that the median age of superintendents had increased to 52, 
indicating that individuals were accessing the position later in life. This increase in the 
median age was even more notable when compared to the median age of 43, which was 
reported in 1923 during a time when most school districts were rural and consisted of 
only a handful of schools. The most recent and comprehensive AASA study, published in 
2010, surveyed just under 1,900 superintendents across the nation and provided similar 
findings to Glass et al. (2000) in regards to age, gender, and race (Kowalski et al., 2010). 
The reported median age of superintendents increased slightly from 52 in 2000 to the age 
of 56 in 2010 (Kowalski et al., 2010). Data regarding female superintendents in the 2010 
study indicated 24.1% of women held the position, which was substantially higher than 
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the 13.2% reported by Glass et al. in 2000. In 2010, it was shown again that women were 
older when accessing the position and had more teaching and administrative experience 
than males, prior to becoming superintendents. Additionally, Kowalski et al. (2010) 
found that non-minority respondents were twice as likely to enter the position before the 
age of 46, whereas their minority peers were accessing the position later in life and less 
than 6% of superintendents nationwide were from an ethnic minority. Demographic data 
is relevant in looking at superintendent turnover because there is a higher chance that a 
minority would be placed (Kowalski et al., 2010) in an urban district, rather than a 
minority superintendent in rural America. Practically, whether or not a minority should 
enter the job of superintendent in an urban district with statistically high turnover makes 
it extremely relevant for job seekers. 
The Kowalski et al. (2010) study findings were most relevant to the thesis of this 
paper because it measured a significant difference between average tenure for urban 
superintendents and other superintendents. In a larger urban district, superintendents 
would not typically be leaving due to moving up to higher paying larger district; 
therefore, their departure would more likely be due to board turnover or a relationship 
problem. Moreover, in looking at the data presented, board turnover typically occurred 
during an election cycle (which is typically four years) and the average superintendent 
tenure was less than three years (Kowalski et al., 2010), thus suggesting the reason for the 
turnover was not due to board turnover, but rather suggested a relationship strain between 
the board and the superintendent. While an argument could be made that the urban versus 
non-urban tenure difference is likely a result of a relationship breakdown, Kowalski et 
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al.’s study did not identify reasons for this difference, including whether the school board 
and superintendent relationship was a cause for superintendent turnover.  
This study supported the Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005), because 
historically, urban superintendents have experienced shorter tenure than other 
superintendents (Kowalski et al., 2010); and due to the fact that the role of the 
superintendent is so diverse for various reasons, geography and size being only two; 
tenure varies. Again, the Decision Output Theory speaks to local governance not having 
resources to support a myriad of initiatives, thus creating turnover of the superintendent 
(Wirt & Kirst, 2005). As mentioned above, the average tenure of an urban superintendent 
was less than three years, suggesting that the relationship between the board and the 
superintendent plays a critical part in the retention of the superintendent. Furthermore, 
large urban districts typically are what superintendents of smaller districts aspire to 
(Glass et al., 2000); so personal reasons to leave (i.e., Continuous Participation Theory) is 
not relevant. Finally, though urban districts do have several competing politics, and board 
turnover may be high (i.e., Dissatisfaction Theory), there are still elections that take place 
and the average turnover in urban districts occurs faster than the overall mean turnover 
rate. By eliminating both the Dissatisfaction Theory and the Continuous Participation 
Theory, the 2010 Kowalski et al. study pointed more to the school board and 
superintendent relationship as a possible cause for turnover (i.e., Decision-Output 
Theory). 
Alsbury studies. Alsbury (2003 and 2008b) studied political versus apolitical 
turnover as a critical variable in the application of the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone 
& Lutz, 1970). In particular, he reported detailed analysis of a so-called “deviant case,” a 
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rural school district in Washington State that initially appeared not to support the 
Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970)— for despite frequent school board 
turnover, there was no consequent superintendent turnover. 
This study used qualitative and quantitative research methods in each of two 
phases in the project. In the first phase of the study, correlational design was used to 
collect and analyze data state-wide on superintendent and school board member turnover. 
In the second phase, the study investigated the existence of a statistically significant 
relationship between school board member and superintendent turnover, delineating 
between all school board turnover and politically motivated turnover and defeat. The 
study described the district as changing over the course of 20 years (1980-2000) due to 
changes in the community and economy. The Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & 
Lutz, 1970) would suggest that an increase in incumbent defeat indicates community 
dissatisfaction with the existing school board and its values; however, Alsbury (2003) 
noted in his findings that superintendent Dr. Miller (a pseudonym to protect anonymity): 
…stepped away from direct board meeting control and allowed the board 
president to handle the conflict thus divesting power from himself and providing 
protection in case this antagonist had, indeed, eventually won support from other 
new board members…. This protective savvy, not detectable through quantitative 
measures, contributed to Dr. Miller’s staying in the district. (p .692) 
Alsbury (2008b) reported school districts in Washington had a high rate of school 
board member change (97%) during the 1993-2000 time frame. Superintendent turnover 
also was high (72%). Out of the 176 school districts who returned surveys, only five had 
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no school board member changes during the study period 1993-2000, while 46 districts 
had no superintendent turnover. 
The Chi-square Test for Independence and the Bonferroni t statistic were used to 
analyze the data collected for the study. Of the 18 Chi-square tests performed, four tests 
showed a statistically significant relationship between incumbent school board member 
and superintendent turnover at an alpha level of .05. However, after using a new alpha 
level of .033 established with the Bonferroni t formula, only one test remained 
statistically significant. 
The strongest relationship between school board member and superintendent 
turnover occurred four years after the 1995 election. Delineation between school board 
member defeat and turnover did not yield noticeable differences in the findings, although 
the one statistically significant correlation came from data comparing school board 
member defeat, with no significant relational results from the non-defeat data. 
With little quantitative data to support the Dissatisfaction Theory, qualitative data 
were evaluated in Phase II of the study in hope of providing additional and more in-depth 
information. In this phase of the study, two districts, whose resulting quantitative data did 
not provide support for a significant link between school board member and 
superintendent turnover, were visited for 2 – 3 days. Data was collected through 
interviews of superintendents, principals, school board members and other district 
personnel, as well as an evaluation of the board minutes and other supporting 
documentation. Qualitative data supported the use of the Dissatisfaction Theory in these 
districts as a useful tool to explain the political chain of events wherein quantitative data 
could not demonstrate a relationship. 
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Relevance to the current study. Two of the studies did support the Decision 
Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005); from which it then can be inferred that there was a 
strain in the relationship, thus supporting the thesis. Some studies, for example Alsbury 
(2003), used a postcard to ask about superintendent turnover: political vs. apolitical; and 
one question alluded to the relationship between the superintendent and school board by 
stating “conflict with other board members” as a reason for leaving that superintendent 
post (Alsbury, 2003, p. 676). However, the vagueness of the survey question left further 
speculation on whether the relationship was severed; if there was conflict amongst board 
members’ viewpoints and not necessarily against the superintendent; or whether the 
relationship was severed due to turnover in school boards, rather than existing board 
members, which is a small, yet distinct significance in the reason for superintendent 
turnover. 
Other research. A considerable number of studies involve interviewing members 
of major stakeholder groups, such as school board members, retired superintendents, or 
community leaders, and asking about reasons for superintendents leaving their positions 
(Grady & Bryant, 1991; Metzger, 1997). The interview findings are usually grouped by 
common features, resulting in lists of items cited as contributing to turnover, such as: 
board member interference in management; conflicts with staff; cultural clashes between 
board members and superintendents hired from outside the district; sports-related 
conflicts, and many others. Other studies have identified the stresses of difficult working 
conditions—including school board disharmony, the pressures of accountability, and the 
increasing complexity that accompanies changing student demographics—as reducing 
many superintendents’ job tenures (e.g., McCurdy & Hymes, 1992). 
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In 2003, the Council of Great City Schools (CGCS) reported results of a survey 
conducted with member districts. Average tenure for urban superintendents was reported 
to be only 2.75 years (up from 2.5 in 2001), but mean tenure for the immediate past 
CGCS superintendents averaged over four years. Supporting CGCS findings, the Council 
of Urban Board of Education (CUBE) reported the tenure of urban superintendents 
between four and five years (National School Boards Association, 2001).  
A more direct line of survey questions that help the researcher identify the root 
cause of superintendent turnover—directly linking the relationship between the school 
board and superintendent and a reason for moving to another district—would help answer 
the thesis question. Furthermore, specific research questions asked in a qualitative study 
as a follow-up to those superintendents who did in fact leave due to strained relationships 
between the board and superintendent would help answer questions posed in this paper. 
Theoretical Frameworks in Previous Studies 
The deficiencies in this literature are also theoretical. Much of the early work that 
addressed superintendent turnover was rooted in Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & 
Lutz, 1970). This theory suggests that districts experience long stable periods of school 
board membership during which community dissatisfaction with district performance 
gradually builds until reaching a tipping point, at which time school board members are 
thrown out of office and their successors replace the superintendent, completing a new 
regime (Grissom, 2010; Hosman, 1990; Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970; Weninger & Stout, 
1989). 
Dissatisfaction Theory yields one prediction about superintendent turnover: that 
politically motivated school board turnover will lead to higher rates of turnover among 
28 
superintendents. But what about turnover during times of school board stability, a 
phenomenon that casual observation suggests is frequent but about which Dissatisfaction 
Theory is silent? 
Existing literature on superintendent turnover offers little theoretical leverage on 
this important question. Seemingly, superintendents leave their posts for many reasons 
other than termination by a newly elected school board. For example, in one survey of 
superintendents who had changed districts, four times as many respondents listed their 
reason for leaving as an opportunity to move to a larger district than those who said that 
the move was due to “changing board/elections” (Glass et al., 2000, p. 89). This 
suggested that career advancement is a more important factor for superintendent turnover 
than are the regime changes Dissatisfaction Theory predicts. Other studies have identified 
the stresses of difficult working conditions—including school board disharmony, the 
pressures of accountability, and the increasing complexity that accompanies changing 
student demographics—as reducing many superintendents’ job tenures (e.g., McCurdy & 
Hymes, 1992). To more fully conceptualize superintendent turnover, a broader 
framework is needed that can incorporate involuntary turnover that dissatisfied 
communities may demand along with voluntary turnover that superintendents seeking 
more prestigious positions or better working conditions may create. 
Studies that have used larger data sets typically have not employed multivariate 
methods that allow them to rule out alternative explanations for the associations they 
uncover. The result is a research base that is much leaner than those examining other 
types of turnover in education (e.g., Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006). Researchers 
have noted the need for studies of superintendent turnover using recent data that allow 
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consideration of the roles and relationships of superintendents and school boards in the 
age of complex accountability systems and changing student demographic trends 
(Fusarelli et al., 2010; Petersen & Fusarelli, 2005). 
Another example, Yee and Cuban (1996) published quantitative studies that 
addressed superintendent turnover that have mainly been descriptive in nature, simply 
presenting tenure statistics for one or more time periods. Perhaps the earliest study to 
indicate that tenure in urban districts significantly exceeds two and a-half years was 
conducted by Yee and Cuban (1996), who presented virtually complete tenure statistics 
for superintendents of the nation’s 25 largest districts for a period covering the entire 20th 
century. They analyzed district records of complete tenure for superintendents who were 
in office at the beginning of every decade. Yee and Cuban’s data were completed from 
1980 and nearly through 1990, allowing them to draw an accurate historical picture of 
tenure in these largest districts.  
Superintendent and School Board Relationships: A Factor of Superintendent 
Turnover 
While instructional leadership is integral to the role of superintendent, the 
increasingly complex political aspects of the job must be handled as well (Education 
Writers Association, n.d.; Hoyle et al., 2005). Superintendent relationships with school 
boards were found to be a decisive element of superintendent tenure (Education Writers 
Association, n.d.). Conflict with the school board is often cited as a common reason for 
superintendents leaving a district, hence their attrition (Rausch, 2001). Allen (1998) 
observed that superintendents listed the relationship with the board as a second reason for 
involuntary non-extension of a contract, while board members listed relationships with 
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the superintendent as the major cause. Despite conflicts, Glass and co-researchers (2000) 
surmised that the school board and superintendent must work together to connect the 
school district with the needs of the community (Goodman & Zimmerman, 2000).  
While many school boards and superintendents described having mutually 
cooperative relationships, Farkas, Johnson, Duffett, and Foleno (2001) reported that 65% 
of superintendents speculated that many school boards simply wanted leaders the board 
could control. Furthermore, over 80% of superintendents have reported feeling frustrated 
with politics and bureaucracy of the job (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003; Farkas et al., 
2001). A primary source of frustration, from a superintendent’s perspective, stemmed 
from school boards micromanaging or interfering in superintendents’ administrative 
responsibilities (Harvey, 2003); with more than two-thirds of superintendents stating that 
their board meddled in issues not within the scope of its responsibility. According to 
Goodman and Zimmerman (2000), a quality working relationship between effective 
leaders and school boards is a “key cornerstone of the foundation for high student 
achievement” (p. 1). As local school boards are the sole evaluators of superintendent 
performance and renewal of contracts, a quality working relationship with members 
directly influences the tenure of the superintendent. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the superintendent and the school board 
that supervises him or her is a central aspect of the superintendency. The school board is 
the superintendent’s statutory employer and supervisor, and the two parties work together 
to co-create policy for the school district. Therefore, in case-based studies of 
superintendent turnover, difficulties related to working with board members are typically 
the most frequently identified contributors (Parker, 1996; Richardson, 1998; Tallerico & 
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Burstyn, 1996). These difficulties have included conflict between the superintendent and 
board and the challenges of working with a board whose members cannot cooperate with 
one another, which are often related (Grissom, 2010; Mountford, 2008). Reasons cited for 
poor relationships between superintendents and their school boards have included role 
confusion, tendencies among some board members to micromanage, and incompatible 
approaches to decision-making (Danzberger, Kirst, & Usdan, 1992; Kowalski, 1999; 
McCurdy & Hymes, 1992; Mountford, 2008).  
Despite evidence that positive board-superintendent relationships are the norm 
rather than the exception (Glass et al., 2000), findings from surveys of superintendents 
have supported the conclusion from qualitative studies that conflict with the school board 
is often an important factor in a superintendent’s exit. In surveys of superintendents who 
had left positions in Nebraska and South Carolina by Grady and Bryant (1991) and 
Monteith and Hallums (1989), respectively, board conflict or interference was cited by 
more than half of respondents as a contributor to their departure (Grissom, 2010). In 
Eaton and Sharp’s (1996) survey of superintendents which asked why their predecessor 
left the district, board relationship conflict was identified as a similarly large factor. 
Though not articulated in these studies, it is important to emphasize that conflict between 
board members and a strained relationship between the board and the superintendent can 
influence both the superintendent’s decision to stay or go and the board’s decision to 





The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of 
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationships 
between the school board and the international school director is linked to international 
school director tenure in their previous position.  
This study combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. A 
questionnaire (see Appendix A) was distributed to a sample of international school 
directors (both for profit and non-profit). They were asked to answer specific 
demographic questions about themselves and the history of board and superintendent 
tenure in their previous position. The data collected included: age, gender, race, highest 
degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position, along with an open ended question 
and a question that asks specifically about the school board and superintendent 
relationship in the previous position. 
Research Questions 
Specifically, this study investigated the following questions: 
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors? 
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school 
directors correlate to length of tenure? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree 
achieved, and tenure in their previous position?  
Null Hypotheses In examining the second research question, does relationship 
between school board members and international school directors correlate to director 
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turnover; anecdotal experience indicated the relationship between the school board and 
director will impact turnover. Furthermore, if the relationship between the school board 
and director is poor, it is predicted that the director is likely to report they left their 
position within a four year margin – three years is the typical initial contract of an 
international school director (as indicated on the questionnaire – Appendix A). 
In examining the first research question, it is expected that a key factor 
influencing turnover will be the relationship between the international school director and 
the school board, as described in the Decision Output Theory; therefore, the hypothesis 
for the second research question is:  
1. International school director tenure in the previous position is significantly 
related to the self-reported relationship between the school board and the 
international school director.  
In examining the third research question, the following null hypotheses are 
measured: 
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position. 
2. International school director race is not significantly related to tenure in their 
previous position. 
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related 
to tenure in their previous position. 
4. International school director age is not significantly related to tenure in their 
previous position.  
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Analysis 
Questionnaire. The questionnaire included open-ended questions about reasons 
leaving their most recent position. The open-ended questions are listed below. 
1. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position. 
2. Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and 
the relationship with the board. 
The reported reasons for turnover were analyzed to determine a significant 
relationship between a number of demographic characteristics and director turnover 
influenced by negative director/school board relationship. Previous research has indicated 
a variety of self-reported reasons for superintendent turnover: retiring; promoted to a new 
job; and conflict with school board (Alsbury 2003, 2008b; Glass et al., 2000; Kowalski et 
al., 2010). Each of the reasons for turnover reported by respondents in the open-ended 
question (question #13, Appendix B) were analyzed using an emergent theme method. 
Concepts (explanatory ideas) were identified from the data in the first stages of analysis 
and given a label or code that describes them. Concepts which are closely linked in 
meaning can be formed into categories; and categories which have similar meanings can 
be brought together into a theme (Field, 2013). 
When an answer was coded “Board” (i.e., director/school board relationship 
influenced turnover), it meant that at some point in their answer to question 13 the 
respondent indicated that a negative or strained relationship was a factor in their turnover. 
If a respondent mentioned “relationship,” then it was coded as “Board.” If respondents 
put multiple reasons for turnover, then all mentioned reasons were counted. An artifact of 
this method of counting the responses is that the percentages of responses totaled more 
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than 100%; but it avoided artificially inflating one category relative to the rest of them. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the school board and superintendent was 
directly asked in question 14 using a five-point Likert scale. The questionnaire item 
reads: Rate your relationship with your school board on the following Likert scale 
(choose one). The scale is as follows: Very Good Relationship; Good Relationship; 
Neutral; Poor Relationship and Very Poor Relationship. The researcher cross-referenced 
question 14 with questions 13 and 15 for a deeper view of the association between 
relationship with board and turnover. 
Open-ended questions 13 and 15 were used because these were potentially 
sensitive questions and respondents may have been reluctant to write that relationship is 
an issue; so they could include a variety of answers to describe the reason for turnover. 
However, any indication that a negative or strained relationship was a reason for turnover 
in their open-ended response was coded as relationship with board, and then was cross 
referenced with how they answered question 14 and their perception of the relationship 
based on the five-point Likert scale. 
Variables. In order to determine which analysis methods to utilize, the researcher 
identified the variety of variables: age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, length of 
tenure in the previous position, quality of relationship with the board of directors/board of 
education, and reason for leaving the previous position. 
Gender was defined as a dichotomous nominal variable with only two categories 
for this study (Field, 2013). Despite the recent developments regarding gender as perhaps 
being a multinomial variable (nominal variables with three or more categories; Field, 
2013) gender is defined as male or female in this study.  
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Age is sometimes measured as a continuous variable, but this questionnaire asked 
respondents to select the age range that described them: 20 – 29, 30 – 39, 40 – 49, 50 – 
59, 60 – 69, or 70+. From this was derived an ordinal variable for age range. 
Highest degree achieved was measured as an ordinal variable in this study (Field, 
2013). Ordinal variables are ranked, for example highest degree achieved is ranked 1 – 
Bachelor’s Degree; 2 – Master’s Degree and so forth. 
Race/ethnicity was defined as a nominal variable. Nominal variables have three or 
more categories that do not have an intrinsic order (Field, 2013); in other words, they 
cannot be ranked. 
Tenure in the previous position is a quasi-continuous variable, measured in years. 
This was captured in question 12 on the questionnaire. 
For this study, the quality of the “relationship between the international school 
director and the school board” was measured as ordinal categorical variable (Field, 2013). 
The quality of relationship variable was categorized from answers to questions 13, 14, 
and 15. Question 13 was an open-ended question in the questionnaire that read: Please 
describe your reason for leaving your previous position. Using an emergent theme 
method, five categories emerged—Board, Contract, Environmental, Opportunity, and 
Retirement—into which the responses were sorted, resulting in a nominal variable. In a 
few cases, responses were ambiguous or indicated multiple reasons for leaving, and the 
researcher examined the responses to question 14 (about quality of relationship with the 
board, on a 5-point Likert scale—see Appendix A) and question 15 (an open-ended 
question: Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and 
the relationship with the board) to determine categorization. For example, for case #7, 
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the answer to question 13 was “Personal, wanted a new country and didn’t like the 
direction we were going,” which could be characterized as “Environmental” or “Board;” 
so the researcher examined the responses to questions 14 and 15. The case #7 response to 
question 14 was “Very Poor Relationship” with the board; and the question 15 response 
was “Board didn’t listen to my advice. It was time for change. They wanted a manager 
and not a leader.” Taking the three responses together, the researcher categorized case #7 
as both “Board” and “Environmental” for the “reason for leaving” variable. 
Methods. Initially, an ordinal logistic regression was considered as a method 
because the dependent variable is an ordinal dependent variable and multiple independent 
variables are categorical. This test would assess the relationship between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable taking into consideration all independent 
variables in the study. More specifically, it could determine which, if any, of the 
independent variables have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. In 
order to run an ordinal logistic regression, there are two assumptions that need to be 
considered. These assumptions are: assumption one, you have one dependent variable 
that is measured at the ordinal level (see question 14, Appendix A); and assumption two, 
you have one or more independent variables that are continuous. Furthermore, in ordinal 
logistical regression, a test for multicollinearity, which occurs when you have two or 
more independent variables that are highly correlated with each other, will need to be run. 
After more consideration and consultation, the researcher considered Spearman’s Rho as 
an analysis method to investigate the correlation between length of international school 
director tenure and quality of relationship with the school board. Spearman’s rho requires 
three assumptions (Laerd, 2015). First, one must have two variables that are continuous 
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and/or ordinal. The variables used for this analysis were length of tenure, as a ratio 
variable; and quality of relationship with the board. Second, the two variables must 
represent paired observations—that is, for each answer to question 12, there is a 
corresponding answer to question 14. Third, there must be a monotonic relationship 
between the two variables—in other words, as the tenure variable increases, the 
relationship variable consistently increases or decreases. 
Population and sample. This study surveyed approximately 300 international 
school directors from a variety of geographical regions: South America, Europe, Africa, 
Asia, and Southeast Asia. A directory was available that enabled exporting of listed 
emails to Excel spreadsheet software. Schools without published email contacts were 
excluded from this study. International school directors were contacted from varying size 
schools from all over the world. The study was not limited to one country in particular, so 
a strong cross-section of global educators can be used in selecting the participants. Due to 
the researcher having been currently employed in Kuwait as an international school 
director and having received the online questionnaire himself, the researcher did not fill 
out the questionnaire. 
Survey instrument. This study used a questionnaire to investigate the perceived 
reasons of international directors for director turnover. These different and/or similar 
reasons for turnover, along with the demographic characteristics of the surveyed 
administrators, were statistically analyzed using Spearman’s rho, a point-biserial 
correlation and a one-way ANOVA in SPSS. The questionnaire was distributed 
electronically to international school directors worldwide. 
Data collection procedures. Questionnaire returns were expected to be 
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approximately 100 international school directors; however, the actual return exceeded 
that amount and will be discussed in chapter four. The researcher used an updated 
directory list in January 2017 from the group list called HeadNet. All the directors, which 
are approximately 300, were selected from this directory and invited to complete the 
questionnaire. The list was maintained in an Excel spreadsheet and broken out by the size 
of school. The size of school was broken out into three categories, as on the questionnaire 
(Appendix A); small size are schools containing students 500 or less; medium size 
schools continue 501-1500 students, and large schools contain more than 1,501 students. 
There was a potential of over 300 questionnaires to be returned if 100% of the 
international school directors return the questionnaire in completion. The questionnaire 
was sent to international school directors using an American curriculum, therefore, no 
translation was required and questionnaire results were all reported in English. Next, each 
administrator received an introductory email from the investigator with a brief 
description of the study, the researcher, and instructions on how to access the web based 
questionnaire. The email explained that the questionnaire itself was voluntary, and the 
anonymity of the participants will be protected. 
Response rates for questionnaires tend to be low in general (Fowler, 2013). The 
advantages to this online format are low cost, potential for high speed of returns, and 
potential for thoughtful and accurate responses. The disadvantages are potential email 
spam filtering that limits the realized sample size, and the limited cooperation of busy 
administrators that may impact the response rate. 
40 
Summary 
Chapter three described the research questions and related hypotheses for this 
study as well as the population, sample, instrument and survey design, data collection 
procedures and statistical procedures to be used. The questionnaire, developed and 
distributed to international school directors by the researcher, was key to the study. The 
questionnaire asked the same individuals to answer a number of open-ended questions in 
paragraph form. This study employed quantitative research procedures and qualitative 
techniques, utilized various statistical analysis and qualitative content methods to answer 
the research questions: these included Spearman’s rank-order correlation, a point-biserial 






The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of 
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationship 
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the 
international director in their previous position.  
Data were gathered through a questionnaire including director gender, race, age, 
highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position as international school 
directors. Each respondent who completed the questionnaire was asked to respond to an 
open-ended question explaining why they left their last position. The data were analyzed 
to determine whether the relationship between the school board and the international 
school director is linked to tenure in their previous position. Furthermore, data was 
collected from respondents to see if tenure in their previous position was impacted by a 
variety of variables, such as: age, gender, race, and highest degree achieved. 
To collect data on international school director demographics, board/director 
relationship, and reasons for director turnover, an invitation with a web-link to a 15-
question on-line questionnaire (see Appendix A) was sent to 306 international school 
directors and administrators in various international schools, both for profit and non-
profit, around the world, including South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast 
Asia. These directors and administrators were asked specific demographic questions 
about themselves: age, gender, race, highest degree achieved; and length of tenure in their 
previous position; plus a question that asked specifically about the school board-
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superintendent relationship in the previous position (question 14, Appendix A).  
Additionally, the questionnaire included two open-ended items about reasons for 
leaving their previous position, which were: 
1. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position. 
2. Please add any additional information regarding your previous turnover and 
the relationship with the board. 
The returned questionnaires were then analyzed qualitatively with an emergent 
theme method (as described in Chapter 3), and quantitatively with Spearman’s rho, for 
their various reasons for turnover as well as the Director/Board relationship. 
Instrument Return Rate 
A total of 155 questionnaires out of 306 were returned, an overall response rate of 
51%. Completed instruments were examined to determine whether the respondents 
followed the instructions properly and provided complete responses. After first filtering 
in SPSS for respondents who answered “yes” to question 1 in the questionnaire, In your 
previous position, were you an international school director/superintendent or 
administrator?, 139 usable questionnaires remained. Next, question 3, Did you report to 
a board of directors/education? was assessed, and any questionnaire from an 
administrator who did not report directly to a school board or group of owner 
stakeholders (functioning as a school board) was discarded. There were a few 
respondents who listed “other” in response to the question. However, their explanations 
made it was clear that they had reported to a school board, and the respondents were 
clarifying whether the board was elected or appointed. So these cases were recoded for 
inclusion, leaving a dataset of 121 usable self-reported instruments. 
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Of the 121 questionnaires deemed suitable for use, some of the administrators did 
not specify their gender, age or years in previous position, while appropriately answering 
their reason(s) for turnover. This is the explanation for some of the variability in the 
questionnaire numbers used in the statistical analysis. One respondent did not answer 
question 12, Years in previous position. That case was excluded from consideration of 
research questions 2 and 3, leaving a total n value of n = 120 for those questions. 
Findings as They Relate to the Research Questions 
The findings below are reported as they pertain to the following three research 
questions investigated in this study: 
1. What factors influence the turnover of international school directors? 
2. Does relationship between school board members and international school 
directors correlate to length of tenure? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree 
achieved, and tenure in their previous position? 
Research question one. In order to address the first research question, What 
factors influence turnover of international school directors? the written reasons for 
turnover (question 13, Appendix B) were analyzed using an emergent theme method (as 
described in Chapter 3) and five general categories emerged: “Board,” “Contract,” 
“Opportunity,” “Retirement,” and “Environmental.” The “Board” category encompassed 
board relations or conflict with board. The “Contract” category included responses such 
as “contract ended” and “contract not renewed,” and simply “contract.” The 
“Opportunity” category included responses indicative of acquiring better 
opportunities/career advancement. The “Retirement” category was self-descriptive. The 
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“Environmental” category included outside civil unrest, school closure, governmental 
interference, job stress, and personal and family reasons (Appendix B). 
Answers coded “Board” indicate that at some point in answering question 13, the 
respondent indicated that a negative or strained relationship with the board was a factor in 
their turnover. In looking further into the 121 responses, three did not respond to question 
13, thus leaving 118 cases. Of those, 20 presented two reasons for turnover, all of which 
were counted. This resulted in the percentages of responses for the group totaling 117%, 
but it did not artificially inflate one category relative to the rest. Question 13 yielded 138 
responses that fell into the five categories as described in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Reason for Leaving 
Question #13, Reason for Leaving... 5 Categories (n = 118). 
Category Board Environmental Contract Opportunity Retirement Total 
Number of 
Responses 
39 36 26 24 13 138 
Percentage 
(Responses) 
28% 26% 19% 17% 9% 100% 
Percentage 
(Respondents) 
33% 31% 22% 20% 11% 117% 
       
Question #13, Reason for Leaving... After 4 Years or Less (n = 77). 
Category Board Environmental Contract Opportunity Retirement Total 
Number of 
Responses 
32 21 25 13 3 94 
Percentage 
(Responses) 
34% 22% 27% 14% 3% 100% 
Percentage 
(Respondents) 
42% 27% 32% 17% 4% 122% 
 
Table 1 above suggests that the top three reasons for international school directors 
to leave their previous position were: school board relationship (28%), environmental 
(26%), and contract (19%). The lower half of Table 1 focuses on the subset of 77 
respondents whose previous tenure was four years or less. The percentage of responses in 
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the “Board” category is even larger, suggesting that relationship with the board is a 
bigger factor in cases of short tenure; and the percentage of responses in the “Retirement” 
category is much smaller, suggesting that retirement is rarely a factor in cases of short 
tenure. 
The responses in Table 1 total more than the 118 cases (for the full dataset) and 
more than the 77 cases (for the four-years-or-less subset) presented, because 20 and 17 
cases respectively had responses indicative of two reasons for turnover. All reasons were 
counted to avoid artificially inflating one category relative to the others, so some cases 
were counted twice. 
Based on these results, the top three factors that answer the first research question, 
“What factors influence turnover of international school directors?” are 1) the school 
board, which suggests school board relationship; 2) environmental factors, which include 
personal reasons and factors beyond the respondents’ control (such as war or school 
closure); and 3) contract completion. These factors are detailed in Appendix B. 
“Contract” responses to question 13 were cross-referenced to question 14 (Please 
rate your relationship with your previous school board on a 5-point Likert-type scale) 
and question 15 (Please add any additional information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the board). Of the 26 respondents whose question 13 
answers were classified as “Contract,” 20 self-reported “poor” or “very poor relationship” 
on question 14, including 9 who answered open-ended question 15 in a way that 
underscored the poor relationship with their previous board as a factor in leaving their 
previous position. This provides evidence that even among the question 13 self-reported 
“Contract” respondents, on probing further, 77% had a “Poor” or “Very Poor” 
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relationship with their board that may have been a contributing factor in leaving their 
previous position. Similarly, question 13 responses categorized as Environmental had 10 
(including one overlapping with the “Contract” responses described above) “Poor” or 
“Very Poor” responses to question 14 Rate your relationship…; and even among the 
“Very Good” or “Good” responses, there were five answers to question 15, the open-
ended Please add any additional information question, that at least partly implicated 
board relations as a possible reason for departure (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Responses Highlighting Relationship with Board as a Likely Factor in Turnover 





Question 14 – Relationship with 
Board 
Question 15 – Additional Information 
Likert rating of 
relationship with 
Board 
Frequency Indicating Board 
as a reason for 
departure 
Blank, or otherwise 
not indicating Board 
as a reason for 
departure 
Board: 
39 of 118 
Very Good and Good 3 2 1 
Neutral 3 1 2 
Poor and Very Poor 33 26 7 
Environmental: 
36 of 118 
Very Good and Good 21 5 16 
Neutral 5 0 5 
Poor and Very Poor 10 3 7 
Contract: 
26 of 118 
Very Good and Good 4 0 4 
Neutral 2 0 2 
Poor and Very Poor 20 9 11 
Opportunity: 
24 of 118 
Very Good and Good 16 0 16 
Neutral 7 0 7 
Poor and Very Poor 1 0 1 
Retirement: 
13 of 118 
Very Good and Good 9 0 9 
Neutral 2 0 2 
Poor and Very Poor 2 1 1 
 
Focusing on the 77 who left after four years or less gives similar results, as seen 
in Table 3. As with Table 2, the frequencies sum to more than the 77 cases presented, 
because two categories were indicated in 17 of the cases. 
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Table 3 
Tenures of 4 Years or Less and Relationship with the Previous School Board 
Question 13 – 
Reason for 
Leaving 
Question 14 – Relationship with 
Board 
Question 15 – Additional Information 
Likert rating of 
relationship with 
Board 
Frequency Indicating Board 
as a reason for 
departure 
Blank, or otherwise 
not indicating Board 
as a reason for 
departure 
Board: 
32 of 77 
Very Good and Good 1 0 1 
Neutral 2 1 1 
Poor and Very Poor 29 23 6 
Contract: 
25 of 77 
Very Good and Good 4 0 4 
Neutral 2 0 2 
Poor and Very Poor 19 8 11 
Environmental: 
20 of 77 
Very Good and Good 9 1 8 
Neutral 4 0 4 
Poor and Very Poor 7 3 4 
Opportunity: 
13 of 77 
Very Good and Good 8 0 8 
Neutral 4 0 4 
Poor and Very Poor 1 0 1 
Retirement: 
2 of 77 
Very Good and Good 1 0 1 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Poor and Very Poor 1 0 1 
 
The frequencies given in Table 2, above, sum to 138, but there were only 118 
viable cases. There were 20 cases that indicated two reasons for turnover, and so were 
counted twice. Table 3 shows similar information for cases with tenure of four years or 
less, and similarly double counts the 17 cases that indicated two reasons for turnover.  
Table 4 contrasts cases that indicated “board” or “relationship” at least once in 









How many times “Board” or 
“Relationship” potentially implicated 
Total Percentage 
3 times 2 times 1 time 0 times   
Yes 19 17 22  58 49% 
No    60 60 51% 
Total     118 100% 
       
Tenure ≤ 4 Years, Cases with Board or Relationship as Possible Turnover Factor 
Yes 16 13 18  47 61% 
No    30 30 39% 
Total     77 100% 
 
So, approximately 49% of cases (detailed in Appendix C) in some way indicated 
that the relationship with the board was potentially a factor in the previous turnover. 
Among the cases with tenure of four years or shorter, relationship with the board was 
potentially implicated in approximately 61% of cases. Descriptive data seemed to 
indicate a possible factor for international school directors to leave their previous position 
was the quality of relationship between the international school director and the school 
board. 
Research question two. In examining the second research question, “Does 
relationship between school board members and international school directors correlate to 
length of tenure?” the descriptive data reported in Table 2, Table 3, and   
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Table 4 above supported an argument that the relationship between the school 
board and the director may be correlated with turnover.  
As noted in the findings above, most international school directors who leave 
their previous position due to the “Board” also indicated their relationship with the school 
board was “Poor” or “Very Poor.” These findings provided some evidence for the second 
research question, “Does relationship between school board members and international 
school directors correlate to length of tenure?” All 120 respondents to question 14, Please 
rate your relationship with your previous school board on the following scale (choose 
one) are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Frequency of Responses to Question 14: Relationship with Previous School Board 
Relationship Rating Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Very Good Relationship 28 23.3 23.3 
Good Relationship 26 21.7 45.0 
Neutral 18 15.0 60.0 
Poor Relationship 26 21.7 81.7 
Very Poor Relationship 22 18.3 100.0 
Total 120 100.0  
 
Table 5 showed that out of the 120 respondents, 54 self-reported that their 
relationship with their school board was “Good” or “Very Good.” In addition, 48 
respondents self-reported that their relationship with their school board was “Poor” or 
“Very Poor.” Further, the 18 respondents who marked “Neutral,” were cross-referenced 
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with the other questions that indicated the type of relationship that existed between the 
Director and Board Members. Of those 18 “Neutral” responses to question 14 Please rate 
your relationship with your previous school board on the following scale (choose one), 
three reported “Board” as a reason for departure in questions 13 and 15. Therefore, after 
further analysis, 51 respondents reported a negative relationship with their school board. 
Descriptive statistics for question 12, where respondents were asked about the 
length of tenure in their previous position, are included in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Responses to Question 12, Years in Previous Position 
Years of Tenure Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Less than 1 6 5.0 5.0 
1 5 4.2 9.2 
2 8 6.7 15.8 
3 41 34.2 50.0 
4 18 15.0 65.0 
5 9 7.5 72.5 
6 8 6.7 79.2 
7 8 6.7 85.8 
8 5 4.2 90.0 
10 5 4.2 94.2 
11 1 .8 95.0 
12 3 2.5 97.5 
15 1 .8 98.3 
17 1 .8 99.2 
21 1 .8 100.0 
Total 120 100.0  
 
In Table 6, the first five rows add up to 78 respondents who reported they left 
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their previous position in four years or less. In examining the second research question, 
Does relationship between school board members and international school directors 
correlate to director turnover? anecdotal experience indicated the relationship between 
the school board and director will correlate with turnover. Furthermore, as seen in Table 
3 and Table 4, if the relationship between the school board and director is poor, it is 
predicted that the director is likely to report they left their position within a four year 
margin – three years is the typical initial contract of an international school director (as 
indicated on the questionnaire – Appendix A). 
Spearman’s rho for research question two. The researcher undertook to use 
Spearman’s rho to investigate the correlation between length of international school 
director tenure and quality of relationship with the school board. Spearman’s rho requires 
three assumptions. First, one must have two variables that are continuous and/or ordinal. 
The variables used for this analysis were length of tenure and quality of relationship with 
previous board. 
Data on tenure was from question 12 “length of tenure in years” with possible 
responses of “Less than 1 year,” “1 year,” “2 years,” etc., up through “29 years,” and 
finally “30 years or more.” For this analysis, the six “Less than 1 year” responses were 
each approximated as .5 years. There were no “30 years or more” responses, so the upper 
end of the tenure scale did not need approximation. In this way, a ratio variable was 
obtained for length of tenure. Data for the second variable was from question 14 which, 
via a 5-point Likert-type scale, captured “quality of relationship with the board” as an 
ordinal variable. These satisfied the first assumption for Spearman’s rho. 
Second, the two variables must represent paired observations—that is, for each 
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answer to question 12, there is a corresponding answer to question 14. Of the 121 
qualified respondents, only case #100 did not answer the tenure question. So, case 100 
was filtered out to meet the second assumption for Spearman’s rho. 
Third, there must be a monotonic relationship between the two variables—in 
other words, as the tenure variable increases, the relationship variable also consistently 
either increases or decreases—see scatterplot Figure 2, and boxplots, Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot: Relationship with Board and Years of Tenure. 
The scatterplot (with point dodging to show frequencies) in Figure 2 shows a 
generally monotonic relationship between the variables, despite the presence of outliers. 
In particular, the three respondents with tenures of 15 years or more are all in the “Good 
Relationship” category, causing a minor inconsistency in the monotonic relationship 
between variables. Furthermore, only cases rating their board relationship as neutral, 
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poor, or very poor, reported tenure of “less than one year” (here approximated as .5 year). 
The boxplots in Figure 3 give another view of these variables. 
 
Figure 3. Boxplots: Relationship with Board and Years of Tenure. 
The boxplots in Figure 3 explicitly show the outliers in the data. In the “Poor 
Relationship” group, nearly all respondents lasted three years, which is the industry 
standard initial contract length for international school directors. In case #1, the 
respondent’s length of tenure was 12 years despite a reported poor relationship with the 
board; and her response to question 13 was “Needed a change / change of board.” Based 
on this, the researcher speculates that the relationship was good for the bulk of the 
respondent’s tenure, and was only “poor” when the board changed, probably for only a 
year or two. 
With the three assumptions met, the researcher ran a bivariate procedure in SPSS 
to find the Spearman’s rank-order correlation among the variables (see Table 7 below). 
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Table 7 
Spearman’s Rho for Relationship and Length of Tenure 
Variables Statistics Length of Tenure in Years 
Quality of Relationship with 
Board (5-Point Likert Scale) 
Correlation Coefficient -.419** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 120 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Based on Table 7, there was a statistically significant moderate correlation 
between quality of relationship with the board and length of tenure, rs (120) = -.419, p < 
.001. The “negative” direction of the correlation coefficient is due to coding “Very Good 
Relationship” as “1,” and “Very Poor Relationship” as “5,” which reflects the order in 
which responses were presented on the questionnaire, to reduce the likelihood of order 
bias. Spearman’s rho reflects the relationship between two variables insofar as the 
relationship is monotonic. If the relationship is not monotonic, Spearman’s rho 
underestimates the strength of the relationship. With this result, the researcher finds 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis, and accept the hypothesis that there is a moderate 
statistically significant relationship between international school directors’ relationships 
with their boards and the length of their tenure. 
Research question three. Finally, in reviewing research question 3, Is there a 
significant relationship between the age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and 
tenure in their previous position? the researcher sought correlations between the 
demographic independent variables and length of tenure. Two of the demographic 
factors, age group and highest degree attained, were ordinal, and assessed with respect to 
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length of tenure via Spearman’s rank-order correlation. Two other variables, gender and 
race, were not ordinal. Gender, a dichotomous variable, was attempted with a point-
biserial correlation procedure. Race/ethnicity, a categorical variable, was first attempted 
with a one-way ANOVA procedure. When the underlying assumptions of ANOVA were 
not met, it was considered as a dichotomous variable, “white” (n = 86) or “non-white” (n 
= 34), and attempted with a point-biserial correlation. 
Analyzing highest academic degree and years of tenure. The researcher used 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation to assess the relationship between the highest 
academic degree attained by respondents and the length of tenure respondents reported 
for their previous position. The procedure requires three assumptions. 
First, the variables must be ordinal or continuous. The dependent variable, tenure, 
is a quasi-continuous variable, treated as ordinal for this analysis. The data representing 
highest academic degree attained, from question 10, had one respondent who answered 
“Other” and gave the explanation “Educational Specialist.” This case was excluded from 
this analysis. The remaining cases are ordered Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD/EdD, so the 
independent variable for highest degree achieved is ordinal, and the assumption is met. 
Second, the variables must represent paired observations. The dataset of 121 
qualified respondents had one who did not answer question 12 about length of tenure, 
bringing the number to 120. Another respondent who answered “Other” was excluded, 
leaving a dataset of 119 cases who answered both questions 10 and 12. Thus, the second 
assumption was met. 
Third, there must be a monotonic relationship between variables. To check this 
assumption, the researcher used SPSS to generate a scatterplot (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot: Highest Academic Degree Achieved and Years of Tenure. 
Visual inspection of the scatterplot for highest degree achieved and length of 
tenure (Figure 4) provided evidence of a monotonic relationship between the variables, 
satisfying the third assumption. So, the researcher generated SPSS output for Spearman’s 
rho. 
The procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation 
between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) = .110, p = .232, 
as shown in Table 8. From this, the researcher finds no evidence of correlation between 
highest degree attained and length of tenure, and no evidence of highest academic degree 





Spearman’s Rho for Highest Degree Attained and Length of Tenure 
Variable Statistics Length of Tenure in Years 
Highest Academic 
Degree Achieved 
Correlation Coefficient .110 
Sig. (2-tailed) .232 
N 119 
 
Analyzing age group and years of tenure. Three assumptions are necessary for 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation. There must be two variables that are (1) ordinal or 
continuous, and (2) represent paired observations, and (3) exhibit a monotonic 
relationship. 
The dependent variable, length of tenure, is a quasi-continuous variable that we 
can treat as ordinal for this analysis. The independent variable, age range (from question 
8) is ordinal. So, assumption (1) was met. 
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one, case #100, who did not 
answer question 12 about length of tenure, bringing the number of cases to 120. Of those, 
all answered question 8 about age group. Thus, assumption (2) was met. 
To test assumption (3), monotonic relationship between variables, the researcher 
used SPSS to generate a scatterplot comparing the variables—see Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Scatterplot: Age Ranges and Length of Tenure. 
Visual inspection of the scatterplot with point dodging and interpolation line for 
age range and length of tenure provided some evidence of a monotonic relationship 
between the variables. For a truly monotonic relationship, for each level of age range, 
length of tenure should increase; but there’s an evident decrease from the 30-39 level to 
the 40-49 level. The other levels did show increasing length of tenure as age range 
increases. Since the 30-39 level consists of only two observations, the researcher 
considered assumption (3) of a monotonic relationship was reasonably met. 
With the necessary assumptions met, the researcher used an SPSS bivariate 
process to find Spearman’s rho. The procedure found a weak and statistically significant 
relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003, as shown 




Spearman’s Rho for Age Group and Length of Tenure 
Variable Statistics Length of Tenure in Years 
Your age (select a range) Correlation Coefficient .266** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 
N 120 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Analyzing gender and years of tenure. The researcher used SPSS to find the 
point-biserial correlation coefficient to examine the relationship between gender and 
length of tenure. The gender variable consisted of data from question 9 on the 
questionnaire. The tenure data was from question 12. There were six answers to question 
12 in the “Less than 1 year” category, which the researcher approximated as .5 year each 
to obtain a continuous variable for length of tenure. 
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one who did not answer 
question 12 about years of tenure, leaving 120 cases. Of those, there were four who did 
not answer question 9 about gender, leaving a dataset of 116 for this analysis. 
Six assumptions must be met for a point-biserial correlation. (1) One of the 
variables must be continuous. The tenure variable, as a ratio variable, meets this 
requirement. (2) The other variable should be dichotomous. The gender variable meets 
this assumption. (3) The variables should be paired. The dataset of 116 cases meets these 
requirements. 
Of the remaining three assumptions, relating to how the dataset fits the point-
biserial correlation model, two were problematic. 
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Assumption (4) is that the continuous variable, tenure, should have no significant 
outliers in either of the gender categories. Inspection of boxplots (see Figure 6) showed 
that outliers were present in both categories of gender, including two “extreme” outliers. 
 
 
Figure 6. Boxplots: Genders and Length of Tenure. 
Assumption (5) is that the variance of the continuous variable, tenure, should be 
equal in both of the gender categories. Homogeneity of variances was tested using 
Levene’s test of equality of variances. A statistically significant result of p < .05 would 
indicate violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variances. This test found there 
was homogeneity of variances for length of tenure for males and females (p = .072), as 






Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Genders and Tenure 
Variable Statistic 
Levene 




Based on Mean 3.290 1 114 .072 
Based on Median 1.504 1 114 .223 
Based on Median and with adjusted df 1.504 1 107.308 .223 
Based on trimmed mean 2.655 1 114 .106 
 
Assumption (6) is that the continuous variable, tenure, should have normal 
distribution in each group of the gender variable. Table 11 shows the dataset does not 
meet the Shapiro-Wilk test for normal distribution (p < 0.05). 
Table 11 
Tests of Normality for Genders and Tenure 
Variable Your gender 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Length of Tenure 
in Years 
Male .224 80 .000 .815 80 .000 
Female .234 36 .000 .813 36 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Also, the histograms in Figure 7—male on the left, female on the right—both 




Figure 7. Histograms: Genders and Length of Tenure. 
 
Since the dataset did not meet the necessary assumptions for normal distribution 
and lack of significant outliers, the researcher used log (variable + 1) to transform the 
continuous variable, representing tenure data from question 12. This transformation 
decreased outliers and improved normality, as shown in the boxplots of Figure 8 and the 
histograms of Figure 9. 
 
 





Figure 9. Histograms: Genders and Transformed Tenure. 
 
Assessing equality of variances, Levene’s test found homogeneity of variances for 
gender and length of tenure (p = .265), shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Transformed Tenure 
Variable Statistics 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 




Based on Mean 1.256 1 114 .265 
Based on Median 1.024 1 114 .314 
Based on Median and 
with adjusted df 
1.024 1 113.126 .314 
Based on trimmed mean 1.287 1 114 .259 
 
Testing further for normal distribution, the researcher examined Q-Q plots 
generated by SPSS and found that, with the transformed tenure variable, scores were 
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approximately normally distributed (see Figure 10; “male” is shown on the left and 
“female” on the right). 
 
  
Figure 10. Q-Q Plots: Genders and Transformed Tenure. 
Having met the assumptions necessary for a point-biserial correlation, the 
researcher ran the procedure using the transformed tenure variable, and found a very 
small and statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure, 
rpb(114) = .079, p = .401, as shown in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Correlations: Gender and Transformed Tenure 
Variable Statistics Tenure with Transformation 
Gender Pearson Correlation .079 




Looking at descriptive statistics for gender and the transformed tenure variable 
(see Table 14), the 80 males had back-transformed tenure M = 4.82 years (SD = .212), 
95%CI (4.32, 5.37), and the 36 females had back-transformed tenure M = 5.27 years (SD 
= .263), 95%CI (4.29, 6.47). 
Table 14 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Genders and Transformed Tenure 




Male Mean .6829 .02370 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound .6357  
Upper Bound .7301  
5% Trimmed Mean .6819  
Median .6021  
Variance .045  
Std. Deviation .21201  
Minimum .18  
Maximum 1.26  
Range 1.08  
Interquartile Range .24  
Skewness .130 .269 
Kurtosis .547 .532 
Female Mean .7216 .04383 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound .6326  
Upper Bound .8106  
5% Trimmed Mean .7231  
Median .6990  
Variance .069  
Std. Deviation .26295  
Minimum .18  
Maximum 1.34  
Range 1.17  
Interquartile Range .30  
Skewness -.043 .393 
Kurtosis .450 .768 
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Analyzing race and years of tenure—one-way ANOVA. The dataset of 121 
qualified respondents included one who did not answer question 12 about years of tenure, 
bringing the number to 120, all of whom answered question 11 about race/ ethnicity. 
Question 12 permitted each respondent to choose only one racial category, presented 
graphically in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Response Frequencies for 10 Racial Categories. 
The researcher attempted to use a one-way ANOVA process to investigate the 
relationship between race or ethnicity and length of tenure. However, the dataset did not 
meet the assumptions necessary for one-way ANOVA, even after transforming the 
dependent variable with the log(Tenure_Ratio + 1) method that had improved outliers 
and normality for gender. 
The first assumption—a continuous dependent variable—is met because length of 
tenure was measured as a quasi-continuous variable with possible answers ranging from 
“Less than 1 year”, “1 year,” “2 years,” etc., up through “29 years,” and finally “30 years 
or more.” The briefest tenure, chosen by six respondents, was “less than 1 year,” which 























years or more,” so no additional approximation was necessary. This assumption 
continued to be met when the log(variable + 1) transformation was applied. 
The second assumption—a categorical independent variable with at least two 
independent groups—is met because respondents could select only one of the ten racial 
groups provided. The third assumption—independence of observations—is met for the 
same reason. 
The fourth assumption—no significant outliers in the independent variable 
categories—was not met, as evidenced by the boxplots in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12. Boxplots: Race/Ethnicity and Tenure. 
Incidence of outliers was improved only slightly by the log(variable + 1) 
transformation. Quantity of outliers decreased from seven (as in Figure 12) to six (shown 
in Figure 13 below). This includes “extreme” outliers, which decreased from three to two. 
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Figure 13. Boxplots: Race/Ethnicity and Transformed Tenure. 
The fifth assumption—tenure should be approximately normally distributed for 
each racial group—was not met. In Figure 14, histograms of the “White (European/ 
Caucasian)” racial group (n = 86) show positive skew and kurtosis with the 
untransformed tenure variable on the left. On the right, after the log(variable + 1) 
transformation, the variable still showed kurtosis, though skew was improved. 
  
Figure 14. Histograms: Race (White) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
The “Hispanic” racial group, shown in Figure 15 below, with n = 8, had non-
normal distribution before and after transformation of the tenure variable. 
69 
  
Figure 15. Histograms: Race (Hispanic) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
The “Arabic” racial group (n = 10) showed somewhat improved skewness and 
kurtosis after transformation of the tenure variable (see Figure 16). 
 
  
Figure 16. Histograms: Race (Arabic) and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
Q-Q plots for the racial categories, with the tenure variable untransformed and 
transformed, mostly did not show normal distributions. Figure 17 shows Q-Q plots for 
the three racial categories discussed above—White (European/Caucasian), Hispanic, and 
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Arabic. On the left are plots with “years of tenure” represented by the untransformed 
tenure variable, and the plots on the right have “years of tenure” with the log(variable + 
1) transformation applied. As seen previously in the histograms, this transformation 
improved normality for the “White (European/Caucasian)” racial group, but did not much 





Figure 17. Q-Q Plots: 3 Racial Groups and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
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With two key assumptions of one-way ANOVA unmet—lack of outliers, and 
normality of distribution in all categories of the independent variable—the researcher did 
not run the one-way ANOVA. 
Analyzing race: White and years of tenure—point-biserial correlation. With 
such small sizes of most of the racial groups, it is unsurprising that distributions did not 
approximate normality. But with all the “non-white” ethnicities considered together, the 
sample would have white (n = 86) and non-white (n = 34). So the researcher considered 
“race/ ethnicity” in binary terms as white or non-white, to see what inferences could be 
drawn about the correlation of self-identification as racially “white” and length of tenure. 
Using data from question 11, the race/ethnicity variable was recoded with just two 
categories, white and non-white, and a point-biserial correlation was performed in SPSS. 
The dataset of 121 qualified respondents included one who did not answer 
question 12 about years of tenure, bringing the number to 120. Of those, all 120 answered 
question 11 about race/ethnicity, leaving 120 cases for this analysis. 
Point-biserial correlation requires six assumptions. (1) The tenure variable meets 
the requirement of a continuous variable, but did not meet other assumptions, so the 
analysis was performed with a log(variable + 1) transformation, resulting in a 
transformed tenure variable which also meets the requirement of a continuous variable. 
(2) The white/non-white variable meets the requirement of a dichotomous variable. (3) 
The variables represent paired observations, meeting the third requirement. 
Assumption (4) is that there are no outliers. This was not met with the 
untransformed tenure variable, but it was reasonably met with the transformed tenure 
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variable. Incidence of outliers was reduced from seven to four, including reducing 
extreme outliers from two to zero, as shown in the boxplots in Figure 18. 
 
  
Figure 18. Boxplots: Non-White/White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
Assumption (5) is that there is homogeneity of variances for both racial 
categories. This was tested with Levene’s test of equality of variances, and was met for 
both the untransformed tenure variable (p = .140), shown in Table 15, and for the 




Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Untransformed Tenure Variable 
Dependent Variables Methods 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Years of Tenure 
(Untransformed) 
Based on Mean 2.213 1 118 .140 
Based on Median 1.157 1 118 .284 
Based on Median 
and with adjusted df 
1.157 1 111.331 .284 
Based on trimmed 
mean 
1.695 1 118 .196 
 
Table 16 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance with Transformed Tenure Variable 
Dependent Variables Methods 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Years of Tenure  
(with Log(+1) 
Transformation) 
Based on Mean .081 1 118 .776 
Based on Median .091 1 118 .763 
Based on Median 
and with adjusted df 
.091 1 117.914 .763 
Based on trimmed 
mean 
.077 1 118 .781 
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Assumption (6) is that the continuous variable should be distributed 
approximately normally for both racial groups. This was not met with the untransformed 
tenure variable, but it was met with the transformed tenure variable, as shown in the Q-Q 
plots for the non-white racial group (Figure 19), and for the white racial group (Figure 
20). 
  
Figure 19. Q-Q Plots: Race: Non-White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
 
  
Figure 20. Q-Q Plots: Race: White and Tenure, Untransformed and Transformed. 
With the six key assumptions underlying the point-biserial correlation relatively 
well met, the researcher used SPSS to run the point-biserial correlation procedure. 
75 
Descriptive statistics for non-white or white racial group and the transformed 
tenure variable are in Table 17. For the non-white racial category, mean tenure (back-
transformed from the transformed tenure variable) was 4.32 years (SD = .225), 95%CI 
(3.60, 5.17). For the white racial category, back-transformed mean tenure was 5.15 years 
(SD = .230), 95%CI (4.60, 5.77). 
Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics for Non-White or White and Transformed Tenure 
Dependent 
Variables 
White or  
Non-White 







Mean .6350 .03861 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower Bound .5565  
Upper Bound .7136  
5% Trimmed Mean .6356  
Median .6021  
Variance .051  
Std. Deviation .22515  
Minimum .18  
Maximum 1.11  
Range .94  
Interquartile Range .30  
Skewness -.207 .403 




Mean .7121 .02480 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower Bound .6628  
Upper Bound .7614  
5% Trimmed Mean .7115  
Median .6990  
Variance .053  
Std. Deviation .23001  
Minimum .18  
Maximum 1.34  
Range 1.17  
Interquartile Range .24  
Skewness .145 .260 
Kurtosis .591 .514 
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There was a very small and statistically non-significant point-biserial correlation 
between Non-White or White racial grouping and the transformed tenure variable, 
rpb(118) = .151, p = .099 (see Table 18). 
Table 18 
Correlations: Non-White or White and Transformed Tenure 
Variable Statistics Tenure with Transformation 
Non-White or White 
Racial Group 
Pearson Correlation .151 
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 
N 120 
 
Table 19 and  
Table 20 summarize the correlations found in this study. 
Table 19 
Correlations: Spearman’s Rho 
Variables Statistics Length of Tenure in Years 
Highest Academic Degree 
Achieved 
Correlation Coefficient .110 
Sig. (2-tailed) .232 
N 119 
Age Group Correlation Coefficient .266** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 
N 120 
Quality of Relationship with 
Board (5-Point Likert Scale) 
Correlation Coefficient -.419** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 120 
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Variable Statistics Tenure with Transformation 
Gender: 
Male or Female 
Pearson Correlation .079 
Sig. (2-tailed) .401 
N 116 
Race: 
Non-White or White 
Pearson Correlation .151 
Sig. (2-tailed) .099 
N 120 
 
After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA 
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed 
below:  
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position (H0 is not rejected). 
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way 
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial 
procedure found a very small and statistically non-significant correlation 
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected). 
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related 
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected). 
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4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position (H0 is rejected). 
Summary 
Chapter 4 described the instrument return rate, findings from the data gathered by 
the researcher as they related to three research questions and the hypotheses for this 
study. For question one, What factors influence turnover of international school 
directors? the researcher determined that the written reasons for turnover (question 13, 
Appendix A) fell into five general categories: “Board,” “Contract,” “Opportunity,” 
“Retirement,” and “Environmental.” Furthermore, descriptive data seemed to indicate the 
quality of relationship between the international school director and the school board was 
possibly a factor for international school directors to leave their previous position. 
For the second research question, Does relationship between school board 
members and international school directors correlate to length of tenure? a Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between the directors’ quality of 
relationship with their boards and the directors’ length of tenure, and found a moderate, 
statistically significant correlation between “quality of relationship” and “length of 
tenure,” rs (120) = -.419, p < .001. The negative direction of the correlation was due to 
coding “Very Good Relationship” as 1 and “Very Poor Relationship” as 5, so this 
correlation should be understood as: poorer relationships correlate with shorter tenure, 
and better relationships correlate with longer tenure. 
For research question number three, Is there a significant relationship between the 
age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position? a 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a very weak and statistically non-significant 
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correlation between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) = 
.110, p = .232. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a weak and statistically 
significant relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003. 
A point-biserial correlation for gender and length of tenure found a very small and 
statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure, rpb(114) = 
.079, p = .401. A one-way ANOVA was unsuccessful at determining correlation between 
racial group and length of tenure, and a point-biserial correlation for white vs. non-white 
racial group and length of tenure found a very small and statistically non-significant 
correlation, rpb(118) = .151, p = .099. 
After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA 
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed 
below:  
1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position (H0 is not rejected). 
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way 
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial 
procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation 
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected). 
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related 
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected). 
4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in 






Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 
2005), this study explored possible reasons for international school director tenure in 
previous positions. This study narrowed the focus on the relationship between school 
boards and international school directors, through the use of a questionnaire of 
international school directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast 
Asia.  
The purpose of this study was to examine the self-reported causes of turnover of 
international school directors. Specifically, this study examined whether the relationship 
between the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure of the 
international director in their previous position.  
Summary of Research Findings 
Chapter 4 described the instrument return rate, findings from the data gathered by 
the researcher as they related to three research questions and the hypotheses for this 
study. For question one, What factors influence turnover of international school 
directors? the researcher determined that the written reasons for turnover (question 13, 
Appendix A) fell into five general categories: “Board,” “Contract,” “Opportunity,” 
“Retirement,” and “Environmental.” Furthermore, descriptive data seem to indicate that 
the quality of the relationship between the international school director and the school 
board is possibly a factor for international school directors to leave their previous 
position. 
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For the second research question, “Does relationship between school board 
members and international school directors correlate to length of tenure?” a Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between the directors’ quality of 
relationship with their boards and the directors’ length of tenure. Preliminary analysis 
showed the relationship to be monotonic, as assessed by visual inspection of a scatterplot. 
There was a negative correlation between “quality of relationship” and “length of 
tenure,” rs (120) = -.419, p < .001. 
For research question number three, “Is there a significant relationship between 
the age, gender, race, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous position;” a 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a very weak and statistically non-significant 
correlation between highest academic degree attained and length of tenure, rs (119) = 
.110, p = .232. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation found a weak and statistically 
significant relationship between age range and length of tenure, rs (120) = .266, p = .003. 
A point-biserial correlation for gender and length of tenure found a very small and 
statistically non-significant correlation between gender and length of tenure, rpb(114) = 
.079, p = .401. A one-way ANOVA was unsuccessful at determining correlation between 
racial group and length of tenure, and a point-biserial correlation for “white or non-white 
racial group” and length of tenure found a very small and statistically non-significant 
correlation, rpb(118) = .151, p = .099. 
After reviewing the data from the Spearman’s rho, point-bivariate, and ANOVA 
analyses, the researcher can address the null hypotheses for research question 3, listed 
below:  
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1. International school director gender is not significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position (H0 is rejected). 
2. International school director racial group could not be assessed with one-way 
ANOVA because the underlying assumptions were not met. A point-biserial 
procedure found a very weak and statistically non-significant correlation 
between white racial group and length of tenure (H0 is not rejected). 
3. International school director highest degree earned is not significantly related 
to tenure in their previous position (H0 is not rejected). 
4. International school director age group is significantly related to tenure in 
their previous position (H0 is rejected). 
Theoretical Implications 
As mentioned in the introduction, several theories are proposed to help explain 
the political environment within schools and their communities. Theories include the 
Dissatisfaction Theory of Democracy (Iannaccone & Lutz, 1970), the Continuous 
Participation Theory (Zeigler & Jennings, 1974), and the Decision Output Theory (Wirt 
& Kirst, 2005).  
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) suggests the governance of 
local school boards is affected by the limitations of economic and personnel resources in 
local school districts. Another significant notion is the low number of citizens who 
actually provide input to school boards. School boards decide which actions to take from 
few options, and with limited resources, causing subjectivity and inconsistency in their 
decisions. Wirt and Kirst’s (2005) model assumes educational policy-making is innately a 
political process that allocates value preferences thorough material (i.e., curriculum). The 
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democratic nature of this process is determined by the interrelationships between the 
political system and other subsystems of the social environment. Wirt and Kirst (2005) 
illustrated these links by describing how subsystems generate inputs of demands on and 
supports of the political [school] system. They suggested the school system converts 
these inputs or demands into public decisions or outputs, which in turn feed allocated 
values back into the social environment. Since school districts lack sufficient resources to 
meet each demand placed upon them by the community, they must choose which group’s 
demands to act upon and which to dismiss. As a result, the school board may or may not 
meet the needs of many of its constituency. Their choice of which concern to address is 
generally dependent on whether or not the school board has a clear understanding of the 
major issues in their respective communities. 
The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is the theory most likely to 
predict superintendent turnover may be caused by the relationship between the board and 
superintendent. This theory deals with the internal interactions within the school board as 
they debate the management of limited resources. This theory suggests that perhaps a 
superintendent and school board relationship could sour due to a disagreement over 
policy decisions and allocation of resources. The possibility of superintendent turnover 
caused by relationship issues (and not only board turnover) is supported more by the 
Decision Output theory than by either the Dissatisfaction Theory (Iannaccone & Lutz, 
1970) or the Continuous Participation Theory. 
This particular study did not provide findings leading to theoretical significance 
regarding superintendent turnover theory. However, if we were to assume that the 
relationship is a significant factor in international school director turnover, then one could 
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argue that indeed The Decision Output Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) is strengthened 
because it contends the governance of local school boards is affected by the limitations of 
economic and personnel resources in local school districts. Another significant notion is 
the low number of citizens who actually provide input to school boards. School boards 
decide which actions to take from few options, and with limited resources, causing 
subjectivity and inconsistency in their decisions. This could suggest that local community 
issues have little influence on the Board and the relationship with the superintendent is 
more of a factor in tenure, but what is happening in the community is indeed a factor. 
Again, this is operating under the assumption that relationship is not a factor, which the 
researcher found evidence of according to this study. As indicated by the findings and 
descriptive data seem to indicate the quality of relationship between the international 
school director and the school board as a possible factor for international school directors 
to leave their previous position. Additionally, to further complicate this issue, 
international schools rarely have school boards that are elected, with only 25% of 
respondents in the questionnaire responding to question 4, “Was your School Board... 
Elected, Appointed, N/A or Other.” Further research would need to be conducted 
specifically looking at elected boards and their relationship with their superintendent and 
the superintendent tenure of those communities. Furthermore, how international school 
boards are elected would also be a factor, because their election process would vary from 
what we are familiar with in the United States due to the expatriate community and the 
overall consistent turnover of School Boards in international communities in general. 
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Practical Implications 
There seems to be evidence that when the top administrator leaves, the entire 
organizational structure is affected, regardless of the professional setting (Alsbury, 
2008a, 2015; Alsbury &Whitaker, 2015; Waters & Marzano, 2007). While existing 
studies have concluded that turnover of the top administrator often revolves around poor 
board/executive relations, regardless of the reason for turnover, this phenomenon may 
cause difficulties in recruiting and securing the next top management position. Although 
a school organization is in crisis, it may present a lucrative, yet arduous opportunity for 
the successor who is hired to solve these acute problems.  
For sitting superintendents looking to move to a new school or for administrators 
aspiring to be a superintendent, using the findings in the research explored in this paper 
would allow a more analytical approach on whether or not to apply for the job. Some of 
the research would prove extremely valuable in regards to the turnover rate with the 
school board. Additionally, understanding the theoretical constructs of the rationale for 
superintendent turnover would help a potential candidate understand the history of the 
position. 
As an aspiring superintendent, research around the causes of superintendent 
turnover would prove to be extremely valuable because it would give the incoming 
superintendent information about why the job was lost—a handbook of “what not to do” 
if you will. Moreover, providing information like this could help build and bridge 
relationships with the school board by creating systems that are transparent and based on 
the questionnaire data. Further analysis as to what exactly went wrong with the school 
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board and superintendent relationship could provide information on how each board 
member communicates and what each board member expects. 
Several implications were found from the results of this study which could have a 
far reaching impact on current educational leaders as well as those who are aspiring to 
those positions. Relationship with the school board is the key. Regardless of a school 
leader’s preparation, his/her career experience, and areas of expertise- if the 
superintendent cannot get along with the school board, it has been suggested that their 
tenure would be short (Achilles, 1997; Blumberg, 1985; Dlugosh, 1997; Fullan, 2002; 
Hoyle et al., 2005; Sharp, 1994). Despite the prediction that superintendent/school board 
relationship is critical to superintendent tenure, no previous studies directly tested that 
hypothesis. 
It seems evident that the understanding of building a positive relationship between 
the international school director and school board, founded on trust and respect, is one 
that has a far-reaching impact on the length of tenure. Descriptive statistics from the 
study seem to support this claim as 43 out of 77 (56%) directors who left their previous 
position in four years reported a negative relationship with their previous school board. 
Taking the time and effort to create a positive relationship, both in everyday 
contact and in those situations where the superintendent is able to participate in a board 
retreat or make away time, is something that most leaders know, but of which they 
probably just need to be reminded. The other aspect to this relationship is the importance 
of understanding the roles of each side. Several respondents reported in question 15 that 
the board micromanaged decisions and thus their relationship was “poor” or “very poor” 
as indicated on question 14. Understanding the role of the director and the school board 
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can help with the relationship between the director and the school board, which would 
help with the increase in tenure. 
This particular study did not provide findings leading to theoretical significance 
regarding superintendent turnover theory. However, if we were to assume that the 
relationship is not a significant factor in international school director turnover, then one 
could argue that indeed a practical implication would be that training for school boards 
and international school directors should focus on improving relationships and 
communication between the school community and the board and superintendent 
together; not just necessarily between the school board and superintendent.  
Limitations of the Study 
Data were gathered on international school directors through a questionnaire that 
included director gender, race, age, highest degree achieved, and tenure in their previous 
position of international school directors. Each respondent who completed the 
questionnaire was asked to respond to an open-ended question explaining why they left 
their last position. The data were analyzed to determine whether the relationship between 
the school board and the international school director is linked to tenure in their previous 
position. Furthermore, data were collected from respondents to see if tenure in their 
previous position was impacted by a variety of variables, such as: age, gender race, and 
highest degree achieved. One limitation may be the sample size of the international 
school directors. However, 155 out of 306 responses (51%) is considered adequate for the 
analysis methods used in this study. Another possible limitation to the study would be the 
collection of self-reported responses from international school directors regarding their 
relationship with their previous school board. No data was collected regarding the school 
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board viewpoint on said relationship.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
As previously mentioned, only two studies to date have measured explicitly, the 
reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; Moos 
& Paulsen, 2014). Studies across the United States have mainly been descriptive in 
nature, simply presenting tenure statistics for one or more time periods (Glass et al., 
2000; Kowalski et al., 2010; Natkin et al., 2002). Furthermore, qualitative studies 
generally report data from case studies, interviews, and small-scale surveys, raising 
concerns that the conclusions drawn from this research are not representative (Monteith 
& Hallums, 1989; Peterson & Fusarelli, 2005; Tallerico & Burstyn, 1996). There is a 
need for a more holistic study, similar to Alsbury (2003) with quantitative and qualitative 
methods, encompassing a representative percentage of superintendents across the world, 
from a variety of school sizes, countries, for-profit and non-profit statuses, and with a 
wide representation of minority and non-minority international school directors as 
descriptive statistics. 
Additionally, further research should examine the reasons why the superintendent 
turns over with a more qualitative approach to fully encompass the reasons for leaving 
the superintendency. 
In order to continue to explore the theoretical aspects of this topic, the researcher 
suggests further research would need to be conducted specifically looking at elected 
boards and their relationship with their superintendent and the superintendent tenure of 
those communities. Furthermore, how international school boards are elected would also 
be a factor, because their election process would vary from what we are familiar with in 
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the United States due to the expatriate community and the overall consistent turnover of 
School Boards in international communities in general. 
Based on Figure 11, showing no respondents from four ethnicities, it is worth 
further investigating the role of race in employment as an international school director. 
Summary 
This study was organized into five chapters along with cited references, the blank 
questionnaire and relevant appendices. The first chapter provided an overview of the 
research project. It included an introduction, problem statement, purpose, significance, 
glossary of terms and a summary. The second chapter provided a relevant, current review 
of the literature regarding superintendent turnover and the causes for such turnover. The 
third chapter explained the research methodology, research questions, procedures, the 
null hypotheses, and the analysis methods. The third chapter also described the scope and 
limitations of the study, population and sample, survey instrument and the data collection 
procedures and a summary. The fourth chapter presented the findings along with the 
analysis of the data and its interpretation, based upon quantitative testing and qualitative 
inquiry. Furthermore, it reported the analysis using Spearman’s rho, point-biserial 
correlation, and a one-way ANOVA. The fifth and last chapter provided summaries, 
implications (both practical and theoretical), future study recommendations and 
conclusions. As previously mentioned, only two studies to date have measured explicitly, 
the reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; 
Moos & Paulsen, 2014).  
Finally, as mentioned in the limitations of the study section of this chapter, no 
data were collected from school board members. The results would provide a unique 
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analysis to compare the self-reported relationship of a school board versus the self-
reported relationship views of the international school director. However, this is very 
difficult to do in the international arena, as school board members experience frequent 
turnover and are difficult to track down. Consequently, no research using international 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent and Questionnaire 
 
Informed Consent 
International School Director Turnover as Influenced by 
School Board/Director Relationship 
 
Introduction 
Welcome, and thank you for your interest! I am a doctoral student in the Seattle 
Pacific University Educational Leadership program and am conducting a research study 
for my dissertation. 
Investigator 
Zakariya Palsha., who is a doctoral candidate at Seattle Pacific University in 
Seattle, Washington is conducting this research. Mr. Palsha can be reached at 206-868-
8618 or at palshaz@spu.edu. Mr. Palsha is employed by Fawzia Sultan International 
School in Kuwait, but this research is solely his own and is not sponsored by his 
employer. Mr. Palsha is working under the faculty advisor, Dr. Tom Alsbury who can be 
reached at 206-378-5099 or at alsburyt@spu.edu.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this study will be to examine the self-reported causes of turnover 
of international school directors. Using a theoretical framework of the Decision-Output 
Theory (Wirt & Kirst, 2005), this study explores possible reasons for international school 
director tenure in previous positions. To date, only two studies have measured explicitly, 
the reasons for the turnover of international school directors (Hodgson & Chuck, 2015; 
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Moos & Paulsen, 2014). This study narrows the focus on the relationship between school 
boards and international school directors, through use of a questionnaire of international 
school directors from South America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia. You have 
been invited to take part in a research study. It will take about 20 minutes to complete. 
You are being invited to participate because you are belong to the listerve HeadNet and 
are currently working as an international school director. Your participation is invaluable 
to this study. 
Procedures 
Each administrator will be sent an introductory email from the investigator with a 
brief description of the study, the researcher, and instructions on how to access the web 
based questionnaire. The email will explain that the questionnaire itself is voluntary, and 
the anonymity of the participants will be protected. The questionnaire data will be 
returned to me via email, but the IP address will be masked and there is no way to 
identify respondents. Data will be coded numerically in excel so no to duplicate 
information. 
Risks and Discomforts 
There are no known inherent risks in or discomforts in voluntarily completing this 
online questionnaire. A commercial online questionnaire will be used, however, despite 
this effort; transfer of information across the Internet is not secure and could be observed 
by a third party. To varying degrees, this is fundamental aspect of all Internet activity and 
communications. If you choose to respond to this questionnaire on a computer and/or 
network owned or accessible by a third party, such as your employer, then such persons 
may be able to view your responses. You may be able to increase your privacy protection 
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by using a limited access computer and by closing your browser window after completing 
the questionnaire. 
Benefits 
There are no known direct benefits to completing this voluntary online 
questionnaire. However, there may be benefits that emerge through a greater 
understanding of turnover for international school directors. 
Participation and Alternatives to Participation 
Your participation is voluntary. Your participation is important, but is voluntary. 
There is no penalty for not taking part, nor any benefit to taking part. Your participation 
is strictly for the purpose of the researcher’s study, and you may decline to participate. If 
you do choose to participate, your responses will contribute to understanding of 
international school director turnover. 
Confidentiality 
The information in the study records will be kept confidential. It is the intent of 
the researcher that your participation and your responses be anonymous. This means that 
no one will know that the information you give came from you. The researcher will make 
no attempt to personally identify respondents. Data will be kept securely and only 
available to the researcher(s) conducting the study. No reference will be made in oral or 
written reports that could link you to the study. The de-identified data may be used for 
future research, presentation, or for teaching purposes by the Principal Investigator listed 
above. 
Subject Rights 
If you have questions at any time about the study or procedures (or if you 
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experience adverse effects as a result of participating in this study), you may contact the 
Principal Investigator Mr. Palsha who can be reached at 206-868-8618 or at 
palshaz@spu.edu If you have questions about your rights as a participant, contact the 
SPU Institutional Review Board Chair at 206-281-2201 or IRB@SPU.edu  
How to Participate (Consent) 
If you wish to participate in the study and you confirm that you are 18 years of 
age or older, please click on the CONTINUE button below. By clicking on the 
CONTINUE button, you are affirming that you are at least 18 years of age and that you 
give your voluntary consent to participate in this study. 
Directions: Please indicate your opinion about each of the questions below by 
marking one of the responses. Your answers are confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers, so please answer all questions honestly. If you are unsure about how to answer a 
question, then please choose what you feel is the best response. Please read each question 
carefully and respond to each of the questions. 
 
International School Administrator Questionnaire 
Questionnaire Page 1: Welcome 
Thank you for helping with my research, which is part of my doctoral work at Seattle 
Pacific University (SPU). I hope it will ultimately benefit all International Schools and 
administrators by providing better information for decision making. 
 
This study investigates some realities faced by International School superintendents, 
directors, and administrators. Members of internet forums for International School 
administrators are invited to participate. 
 
This questionnaire is completely voluntary. It has 15 questions, and most people will 
complete it in less than 5 minutes. You may skip any questions that you do not wish to 
answer. Approximately 300 people are invited to participate. I hope to get approximately 
100 completed questionnaires for statistical analysis. 
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Your anonymity and confidentiality are assured. The questions are about your previous 
position (not your current position), and no personally identifiable information is asked. 
SurveyMonkey.com will log the IP address you used, but I do not have access to it, and I 
cannot associate answers with individuals. 
 
This study has been assigned SPU Institutional Review Board (IRB) number 161706015. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please email me: Zak Palsha, 
palshaz@spu.edu 
 
Also, you may contact the SPU IRB Office -- IRB@SPU.edu -- for information about the 




Questionnaire Page 2: Previous Position 
We are conducting research on the state of affairs for superintendents, directors, and 
other top administrators at International Schools. All information will be anonymous and 
confidential. Please tell us a bit about your previous position. 
1. In your previous position, were you an international 
school director/superintendent or administrator? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
2. Was your school □ For Profit 
□ Non-Profit 
3. Did you report to a Board of Directors / Education? □ Yes 
□ No (please explain) 
4. Was your School Board … ? □ Elected 
□ Appointed 
□ N/a or Other (please explain) 
5. What was the enrollment of your school? □ Small (500 or fewer students) 
□ Medium (501 to 1500 
students) 
□ Large (over 1500 students) 




□ Not sure 
7. What was your position title? (Open text box) 
Questionnaire Page 3: Demographic Information 
Please tell a bit about your demographics. All information will be anonymous and 
confidential. 
8. Your age (select a range) □ 20 – 29 
□ 40 – 49 
□ 60 – 69 
□ 30 – 39 
□ 50 – 59 
□ 70+ 
9. Your gender □ Male □ Female 
10. Highest degree achieved □ Bachelor’s 
□ Master’s 
□ Ph.D. / Ed. D. 




11. Race / Ethnicity □ Arabic 
□ Black (African) 
□ Indigenous Australian 
□ Pacific Islander 




□ Native American / Alaskan 
Native 
□ Persian 
□ Other (please specify) 
Questionnaire Page 4: Career Moves 
Please tell us more about your position changes. 
































13. Please describe your reason for leaving your previous 
position. 
(Open text box) 
Questionnaire Page 5: Board 
Please tell us about your school board / board of directors / board of education. 
14. Please rate your relationship with your previous 
school board on the following scale (choose one). 
□ Very Good Relationship 
□ Good Relationship 
□ Neutral 
□ Poor Relationship 
□ Very Poor Relationship 
15. Please add any additional information regarding 
your previous turnover and the relationship with the 
board. 
(Open text box) 
Questionnaire Page 6: Thank You 





Appendix B: Categorized Reasons for Leaving the Previous Position 
To generate the categorical variable that represented respondents’ reason for 
leaving their previous position, the researcher applied an emergent theme method to the 
responses from open-ended question 13, “Describe your reason for leaving your previous 
position.” In some cases, to determine categorization, the researcher also used 
information from Likert-scale question 14, “Please rate your relationship with your 
previous school board on the following scale (choose one: Very Good Relationship, 
Good Relationship, Neutral, Poor Relationship, Very Poor Relationship)” and open-
ended question 15, “Please add any additional information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the board.” The cases are listed here. 
All responses in the Q. 13 and Q. 15 columns are reproduced here verbatim, 
including spelling, grammatical, usage, and typographical errors. 
 
Board 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for leaving 
your previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the 
board. 
1 Needed a change / 
change of board 
Poor Relationship [No response] 




Most unprofessional Board I have 
worked with 
5 Issues with ownership 
and board of trustees 
Very Poor 
Relationship 
We did not align philosophically 
7 Personal, wanted a new 
country and didn’t like 




Board didn’t listen to my advice. It 
was time for change. They wanted a 
manager and not a leader 
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for leaving 
your previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the 
board. 




I would rather not say 
13 Conflict with owner Very Poor 
Relationship 
Board micromanaged all decisions 
15 Fired Very Poor 
Relationship 
They did not listen to my experience 
17 I had a very big conflict 
with the managing 
director and he was 
supported by ownership 
Poor Relationship The board supported the ownership 
18 board Interference Very Poor 
Relationship 
Promises were made to staff then not 
kept. I was in the position of having 
to face staff with re these broken 
promises 
22 difference of opinion 
with board 
Poor Relationship [No response] 
25 Forced to Retire Poor Relationship The Board of Trustees forced me to 
retire, stating age as a factor 
27 Mission and vision took 
a drastic turn and I could 
not be that flexible. 
Very Good 
Relationship 
The top board members left, sort of 
politics, and that too played a part in 
my leaving. 





Shareholders were not educators and 
were only after profit 





30 Left for personal reasons 
related to health 
Very Poor 
Relationship 
Distinction at the board level causes 
my health issues 




Did not agree with BOG.... 
micromanaged too much 
38 Conflict with owner and 




41 The BOArd changed and 
I was not offered a 
contract beyond my 








Micromanaged by owner and board 
109 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for leaving 
your previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the 
board. 
43 did not agree with 
stakeholders........ they 
have no idea about 
education 
Poor Relationship they were after money and I did not 
agree with that 
46 Complex issues Very Poor 
Relationship 
Board astranged 
55 Working for a ‘for-
profit’ school was not 
what I expected 
Very Poor 
Relationship 
the for profit attitude got in the way 
58 priorities keep shifting 
and there’s no vision 
Very Poor 
Relationship 
Board follows flavor of the month; 
does not have a Visio 
59 Not a good fit Poor Relationship [No response] 
64 Conflict of interest, the 





68 conflict with 
stakeholders and contract 
was not renewed 
Neutral [No response] 
73 change of direction from 
stakeholders 
Neutral [No response] 




Micromanaged every decision 
86 Did not meet board 
objectives 
Poor Relationship Board was not reasonable with their 
demands 
91 Complicated...the school 
could get new direction 
...but also Board relations 
had reached a low from 
which there could be no 
recovery 
Good Relationship As mentioned - for 15 years it was 
Good to Very Good at the last 2 years 
the relationship went little by little 
into the porcelain 
99 Micromanagement from 
2 founding trustees. 
Neutral Founders wanted a world-class 
program without enough funding. 
They had a chaotic financial aide 
criteria and policy that was making 
impossible to even break even. Over 
50% of the students received 
financial assistance. 
110 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Board;” n=34 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for leaving 
your previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the 
board. 
103 My contract was not 
renewed by the Board. 
Poor Relationship My previous school’s board structure 
and governing bylaws was seriously 
flawed, resulting in great turnover 
and personal-interest board member 
agendas. 
105 Unhappy and 
dysfunctional school 
Neutral [No response] 
111 Board of Owners broke 
verbal contract 
agreement. 
Good Relationship No other comment 
 
Environmental 
 “Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for 
leaving your previous 
position. 





Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 





6 Needed a change Good 
Relationship 
None 
11 Personal reasons Neutral [No response] 
12 It was interim position Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
14 time for a change, 
personal 
Poor Relationship It was good I left 
19 Needed a change.... 5 




There were no members from the 
original board that hired me left 
when I left after 5 years. I got 
along with the board members 
professionally but that was it. 
21 I would rather not say Very Poor 
Relationship 
They were very unprofessional 




 “Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for 
leaving your previous 
position. 





Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
33 School closed Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
44 Time for a change, I 
did what I could for 
the organization 
Neutral None 
50 Moved country Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
51 Relocation Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
63 Personal reasons Very Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 





71 my kids graduated so 




74 War stricken country Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
77 Changed schools Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
80 pursue my PHD Neutral [No response] 





89 Personal Poor Relationship just wasn’t a pleasant post 
92 My father died, 




Best Board I ever worked with! 
95 Enough time there, 
felt I’d done what I 
wanted. Also 
significant was the 





In five years, I had two very 
difficult years with the Board one 
okay and two very good. 
102 Wanted a new 
challenge. 
Neutral [No response] 
112 
 “Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Environmental;” n=28 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please describe 
your reason for 
leaving your previous 
position. 





Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
108 After four years at my 
previous school, I had 
achieved the goals 
(new building project) 
and felt it was time to 
move on to a new 
school and fresh goals 
Good 
Relationship 
The decision to leave my previous 
school after four years was mine. I 
notified the board one year in 
advance, and was part of the 
selection and transition processes 
for the new Director 
110 family reasons Very Good 
Relationship 
My relationship with the board as a 
whole was extremely positive, 
though I had challenges with one 
board member, which made 
working with the whole board 
difficult at times 
113 Relocation Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
114 The school enrollment 




My relationship with Board 
members at my previous position 
was very professional. Board 
members were supportive and 
understanding. They helped when 
needed and respected the 
Director’s responsibilities without 
interfering. 
115 Local circumstances 
made it too unstable 




The Board was also unstable, there 
was a high turnover rate for ex-pats 
in the country 
 
Opportunity 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving your 
previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
8 Went to a bigger 
school 
Neutral [No response] 
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving your 
previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
16 Better position Very Good 
Relationship 
No issues with board 
26 Better opportunity Neutral [No response] 
45 Finish contract and 
more money in new 
job 
Poor Relationship [No response] 
52 Moved to another 
school 
Neutral [No response] 
56 bigger school Good Relationship [No response] 
57 New job better for me Neutral [No response] 
75 Promoted to Director Good Relationship [No response] 





79 I got a promotion to 
be a director within 
the same school 
Neutral [No response] 
82 promotion to Director Neutral [No response] 
84 Moved to better 
opportunity for me 
Good Relationship [No response] 
85 Moved countries; 
bigger school 
Good Relationship No issues 





93 Carreer move Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
94 New challenges Good Relationship [No response] 
96 Voluntary. Looking 




No influence on my leaving 
97 Relocation to a new 





101 More responsibility Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 
104 I was promoted to 
Director General 
Good Relationship [No response] 
106 to become a school 
director 
Neutral [No response] 
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Opportunity;” n=24 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving your 
previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 






My previous board had already 
extended an additional year 
contract to me in hopes that I 
would continue there. 
118 To take another 
position in the USA 
Very Good 
Relationship 
Previous position I stayed 5 years - 
the Board was wonderful! 
119 New ooportunities 
and growth 
Good Relationship [No response] 
 
Contract 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Contract;” n=20 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving … 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
2 contract expired Good Relationship [No response] 
9 End of fixed contract. Very Good 
Relationship 
Contract previous to the one 
reported on here: 6 years, good 
relationship with the board. Prior 
to that, 2 years - worked for an 
owner, no board. 
32 Contract expired Poor Relationship [No response] 
34 Contact expired Poor Relationship Did not align with BOT 
35 contract ended Poor Relationship [No response] 
37 Contract Very Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
39 completion of initial 
contract 
Poor Relationship Focussed on the wrong things, we 
disagreed on key principles 
40 completed contract Poor Relationship We did not see eye to eye on 
critical issues 
48 contract ended Poor Relationship [No response] 
53 Contract expired Poor Relationship [No response] 
54 Completed contract Poor Relationship Wasn’t a good match for me 
61 Done with contract Poor Relationship [No response] 
115 
“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Contract;” n=20 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving … 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
62 Expiration of contract Poor Relationship board views and my views 
differed 
65 Contract expired Poor Relationship board was always split on 
decisions, hard to move forward 
66 Completed my 
contract 
Poor Relationship [No response] 
67 Expiration of my 
initial contract, 
mutually agreed not 
to renew 
Poor Relationship Key issues we disagreed on, for 
example budget and class size 
76 I change jobs every 3 
years 
Neutral [No response] 
81 Initial contract 
completed 
Poor Relationship [No response] 
120 End of contract Very Good 
Relationship 
[No response] 







“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Retirement;” n=12 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving your 
previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
20 Retired, now working 
as an interim HoS 
Good Relationship [No response] 
24 Retired Neutral [No response] 
31 Retired Good Relationship [No response] 
47 Retired Good Relationship [No response] 
49 Retired Very Good 
Relationship 
Great working relationship 
60 Retired Neutral [No response] 
72 Retiring Good Relationship [No response] 
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“Reason for leaving previous position” categorized as “Retirement;” n=12 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Please 
describe your reason 
for leaving your 
previous position. 
Q. 14: Please rate 
your relationship 
with your previous 
school board ... 
Q. 15: Please add any additional 
information regarding your 
previous turnover and the 
relationship with the board. 
90 Retirement Very Good 
Relationship 
Generally, I have had over 30 
years of success with school 
boards, but there are thoses years 
when the board mix is not good or 
the leadership strong. Elected 
boards are a roll of the dice. You 
have to work with what you get. 
98 Retiring Good Relationship I worked with appointed and 
elected Boards; Appointed are far 
more rational.objective and 
pleasant. 
109 Retirement. Good Relationship Board turnover was normal for a 
school with a Board consisting of 
members elected from an 
expatriate, internationally mobile 
community: Most members 
fulfilled their two-year terms; a 
few stayed three or more years. 
The Board Chair, Board, and 
Director normally worked closely 
and well in encouraging specific 
parents to be nominated and in 
developing and revising Board-
Director agreements (annually) on 
governance. 
112 retirement Very Good 
Relationship 
healthy international school 
community with 50+ nationalities 




Appendix C: Cases with evidence of conflict with board as a factor in job 
turnover 
Of 118 qualified respondents, 58 (49%) indicated there had been a difficult 
relationship or conflict with their board of education/board of directors/board of 
governors/board of trustees in their answers to questionnaire questions 13, 14, and/or 15. 
Question 13 was “Please describe your reason for leaving your previous position.” 
An open-ended text box was provided. The researcher used an emergent theme process to 
analyze the responses. 
Question 14 was “Please rate your relationship with your previous school board 
on the following scale (choose one).” A 5-level Likert-type scale was provided, with 
choices of: Very Good Relationship, Good Relationship, Neutral, Poor Relationship, 
Very Poor Relationship. 
Question 15 was “Please add any additional information regarding your previous 
turnover and the relationship with the board.” It provided an open-ended text box. 
Relatively few respondents answered question 15. 
All responses in the Q. 13 and Q. 15 columns are reproduced here verbatim, 
including spelling, grammatical, usage, and typographical errors. 
 
3 of 3 answers. Q. 13, Reason for Leaving, Q. 14, Relationship with Board, and  
Q. 15, Additional Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship. 
3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
3 multiple reasons: 
budget, Board 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Most unprofessional 
Board I have worked 
with 
118 
3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
5 Issues with 
ownership and board 
of trustees 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
We did not align 
philosophically  
7 Personal, wanted a 
new country and 
didn’t like the 






Board didn’t listen to my 
advice. It was time for 
change. They wanted a 
manager and not a leader 
13 Conflict with owner  Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Board micromanaged all 
decisions  
15 Fired Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
They did not listen to my 
experience 
17 I had a very big 
conflict with the 
managing director 




The board supported the 
ownership 
18 board Interference Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Promises were made to 
staff then not kept. I was 
in the position of having 
to face staff with re these 
broken promises 




The Board of Trustees 
forced me to retire, 
stating age as a factor  







Shareholders were not 
educators and were only 
after profit 
36 End of contract and 
BOG issues 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Did not agree with 
BOG.... micromanaged 
too much  
38 Conflict with owner 
and board of 
governors  
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Unprofessional  
42 Mutual decision to 
move on 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Micromanaged by owner 
and board 
43 did not agree with 
stakeholders........ 
they have no idea 
about education  
Board Poor 
Relationship 
they were after money 
and I did not agree with 
that 




3 of 3 answers indicating conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=19 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
58 priorities keep 
shifting and there’s 
no vision 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
Board follows flavor of 
the month; does not have 
a Visio  
67 Expiration of my 
initial contract, 






Key issues we disagreed 
on, for example budget 
and class size 
83 disagreement with 
Board/Owner group 








Board was not 
reasonable with their 
demands 
103 My contract was not 






My previous school’s 
board structure and 
governing bylaws was 
seriously flawed, 
resulting in great 
turnover and personal-
interest board member 
agendas.  
 
2 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, and Question 14, Relationship with 
Board, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship. 
2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 14) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Reason for 
Leaving 
Reason Category Q. 14: 
Relationship 
Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
1 Needed a change / 






10 conflict with owner 
group 
Board Very Poor 
Relationship 
I would rather not 
say 
22 difference of 




29 Owner and Board of 
Directors conflict 




2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 14) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7 
Case 
ID 
Q. 13: Reason for 
Leaving 
Reason Category Q. 14: 
Relationship 
Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
41 The BOArd 
changed and I was 
not offered a 
contract beyond my 
initial 3 year 
contract  
Board, Contract Very Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
55 Working for a ‘for-
profit’ school was 





the for profit 
attitude got in the 
way 
64 Conflict of interest, 
the board of trustees 
is not a real board,  




2 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, and Question 15, Additional 
Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship. 
2 of 3 answers (Q. 13, Q. 15) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=3 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
27 Mission and vision 
took a drastic turn and 
I could not be that 
flexible. 
Board Very Good 
Relationship 
The top board members 
left, sort of politics, and 
that too played a part in 
my leaving. 
91 Complicated...the 
school could get new 
direction ...but also 
Board relations had 
reached a low from 




As mentioned - for 15 
years it was Good to Very 
Good at the last 2 years 
the relationship went little 
by little into the porcelain 
99 Micromanagement 
from 2 founding 
trustees.  
Board Neutral Founders wanted a world-
class program without 
enough funding. They had 
a chaotic financial aide 
criteria and policy that 
was making impossible to 
even break even. Over 





2 of 3 answers. Question 14, Relationship with Board, and Question 15, Additional 
Information, at least partly implicate Board and/or Relationship. 
2 of 3 answers (Q. 14, Q. 15) show conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=7 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
21 I would rather not 
say 
Environmental Very Poor 
Relationship 
They were very 
unprofessional 
30 Left for personal 






Distinction at the board 
level causes my health 
issues 
34 Contact expired Contract Poor 
Relationship 
Did not align with 
BOT 




Focussed on the wrong 
things, we disagreed 
on key principles 
40 completed contract  Contract Poor 
Relationship 
We did not see eye to 
eye on critical issues 




board views and my 
views differed  
65 Contract expired  Contract Poor 
Relationship 
board was always split 
on decisions, hard to 
move forward  
 
1 of 3 answers. Question 13, Reason for Leaving, at least partly implicates Board 
and/or Relationship. 
1 of 3 answers (Q. 13) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=3 
Case 
ID 




Q. 14: Relationship Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
68 conflict with 
stakeholders and 
contract was not 
renewed 
Board Neutral [No response] 
73 change of direction 
from stakeholders 
Board Neutral [No response] 
111 Board of Owners 
broke verbal contract 
agreement. 
Board Good Relationship No other comment 
 
122 
1 of 3 answers. Question 14, Relationship, implicates Board and/or Relationship. 
1 of 3 answers (Q. 14) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=15 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 




It was good I left 
32 Contract expired Contract Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
35 contract ended Contract Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
37 Contract  Contract Very Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
45 Finish contract and 





48 contract ended Contract Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
53 Contract expired Contract Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
54 Completed contract  Contract Poor 
Relationship 
Wasn’t a good match 
for me 
59 Not a good fit Environmental Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
61 Done with contract  Contract Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 
63 Personal reasons Environmental Very Poor 
Relationship 
[No response] 










89 Personal Environmental Poor 
Relationship 
just wasn’t a pleasant 
post 






1 of 3 answers. Question 15, Additional Information, at least partly implicates 
Board and/or Relationship. 
1 of 3 answers (Q. 15) shows conflict or relationship as a factor of turnover; n=4 
Case 
ID 






Q. 15: Additional 
Information 
19 Needed a change.... 
5 years in Nigeria is 
a long time 
Environmental Good 
Relationship 
There were no members 
from the original board 
that hired me left when I 
left after 5 years. I got 
along with the board 
members professionally 
but that was it. 
95 Enough time there, 
felt I’d done what I 
wanted. Also 
significant was the 
age of my kids 
(transitioning to 
middle school) 
Environmental Very Good 
Relationship 
In five years, I had two 
very difficult years with 
the Board one okay and 
two very good.  
110 family reasons Environmental Very Good 
Relationship 
My relationship with the 
board as a whole was 
extremely positive, 
though I had challenges 
with one board member, 
which made working with 










The Board was also 
unstable, there was a high 
turnover rate for ex-pats 
in the country 
 
